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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights—the highest au-
thority dedicated to enforcing international human rights law in the 
Inter-American system—has received considerable praise for its in-
fluential and innovative reparations decisions.1  Nonetheless, its 
more innovative reparations orders apparently suffer from a serious 
problem of legitimacy—in that the Court may not be legally author-
ized to issue them—because they do not seem to respond to the hu-
man rights violations that the Court identifies.  In the vast majority 
of its reparations decisions since 2001, the Court has ordered what 
one might call extraordinary reparations:  measures such as human 
rights training,2 changes to law and policy,3 improvements in the 
                                                     
1  See PHILIP ALSTON & RYAN GOODMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1009 
(2012); Thomas M. Antkowiak, An Emerging Mandate for International Courts: Victim 
Centered Remedies and Restorative Justice, 47 STAN. J. INT’L L. 279, 290 (2011) (describ-
ing the American system as tailored to the interests of human rights victims in re-
ceiving “recognition, restoration, and accountability”); Conference Report, Repara-
tions in the Inter-American System: A Comprehensive Approach, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 1375, 
1376 (2007); Gina Donaoso, Inter-American Court of Human Rights’ Reparations Judg-
ments. Strengths and Challenges for a Comprehensive Approach, 49 REVISTA IIDH 29, 29-
30 (2009); Ruth Rubio-Marín & Clara Sandoval, Engendering the Reparations Jurispru-
dence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: The Promise of the Cotton Field 
Judgment, 33 HUM. R. Q. 1062, 1077-89 (2011); Judith Schonsteiner, Dissuasive 
Measures and the “Society as a Whole”: A Working Theory of Reparations in the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, 23 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 127, 140-44 (2007); Clara 
Sandoval Villalba, The Concepts of ‘Injured Party’ and ‘Victim’ of Gross Human Rights 
Violations in the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights: A Commen-
tary on their Implications for Reparations, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, 
WAR CRIMES AND CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 243, 244-45 (Carla Ferstman et al eds., 
2009) (referencing how the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights has been favorably described as victim-centered because reparations 
measures are generally oriented around victim needs and interests, whereas the 
model of the European Court is cost-centered).  
2 See, e.g., Gutiérrez v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 271, ¶ 168 (Nov. 25, 2013) (ordering the State to in-
corporate “training courses on the obligations of respect for and guarantee of hu-
man rights” into law enforcement training curricula). 
3 See, e.g., Luna López v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct H.R. (ser. C) No. 269, ¶ 244 (Oct. 10, 2013) (ordering the State to im-
plement the necessary rehabilitative policies “in an effective and permanent man-
ner”). 
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justice system,4 and provision of education,5 water,6 food,7 or public 
services.8  These are typically ordered in addition to compensation 
payments and other measures explicitly designed to undo or elimi-
nate the violation’s consequences.9  Although the Court has not ad-
equately defended its practice of ordering extraordinary repara-
tions, this Article will argue that these orders legitimately aim to 
repair or cease unacknowledged aspects of human rights violations 
and their resulting harms.  Some are disguised orders to cease on-
going violations, others aim to repair victim trust in the state, and 
some seek to repair harm to communities. 
Despite the importance of its innovations, the Inter-American 
Court has not explained in depth—even in response to state com-
plaints—why it is legally authorized or empowered to order ex-
traordinary reparations, especially when it has already ordered 
measures supposedly sufficient to eliminate the effects of past hu-
man rights violations.  For example, following a forced disappear-
ance, the Court ordered monetary compensation for the victim’s 
family supposedly equivalent to the harm suffered, but went on to 
order, among other measures, a literacy program for the victim’s 
                                                     
4 See, e.g., Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 241, ¶ 100 (April 27, 2012) (noting arbitrary 
arrests of young men in the country). 
5 See, e.g., Barrios Family v. Venezuela, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 237, ¶ 336 (Nov. 24, 2011) (ordering the 
State to provide scholarships so that victims may be educated in vocational or uni-
versity programs). 
6 See, e.g., Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 146, ¶ 230 (March 29, 
2006) (ordering the State to “supply sufficient drinking water for consumption and 
personal hygiene to the members of the Community”).  
7 See, e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Repa-
rations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 214, ¶ 301 (Aug. 24, 
2010) (ordering the State to assure the “delivery of food of sufficient quality and 
quantity to ensure an adequate diet”). 
8 See, e.g., Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, Preliminary Objection, Merits, 
Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 250, ¶ 284 
(Sept. 4, 2012) (ordering the State to implement public rehabilitative programs for 
the Pacux settlement community). 
9 See Bridget Mayeux, Justin Mirabel, & Ariel Dulitzky, Collective and Moral 
Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 22-24 (2009) (reporting 
on the relatively “new paradigm for reparations under international human rights 
law” of “ordering and enforcing collective moral reparations for mass human rights 
violations”). 
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mother.10  The American Convention on Human Rights legally em-
powers the Court to order reparations only for identified human 
rights violations, not to order any measure it thinks might make for 
a better state or for a more human rights-friendly social environ-
ment.11  The Court is not an international legislature.  As some states 
have complained,12 extraordinary reparations do not seem to ad-
dress the violation’s effects or otherwise have a “causal nexus” with 
the violation, since other reparative measures, such as restitution or 
compensation, are supposedly sufficient for that objective.  They ap-
pear to go beyond “the re-establishment of the previous situation 
and the elimination of the effects produced by the violation, as well 
                                                     
10 See Gomez Palomino v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment, In-
ter- Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 136, ¶ 147 (Nov. 22, 2005) (ruling that “Mrs. Victoria 
Margarita Palomino-Buitrón . . . may participate in a literacy program implemented 
by the corresponding public education entities”). 
11 See American Convention on Human Rights art. 63(1), Nov. 22, 1969 available 
at http://www.cartercenter.org/resources/pdfs/peace/democracy/des/amer_ 
conv_human_rights.pdf [perma.cc/N86P-GY62] (last visited Jan. 16, 2016) [herein-
after Convention] (conditioning the awarding to an injured party the enjoyment of 
his violated right on a finding “that there has been a violation of a right or freedom 
protected by this Convention”).  
12 States have argued that these measures of reparation are illegitimate because 
they are not proportional to the harm resulting from the human rights violation.  
For example, in Gonzalez v. Mexico, considering state indifference to the disappear-
ance and murder of three young women, Mexico asserted that, “determining and 
granting these measures of reparation separately would involve a disproportionate 
burden for the State, because they would exceed the damage caused.”  González 
(“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 205, ¶ 449 (Nov. 16, 2009).  Relatedly, and importantly, Mexico 
also claimed, “[t]he State indicated that the reparations requested by the represent-
atives ‘are excessive, repetitive and constitute a request for double reparation, be-
cause many of them refer to the same violations.’”  Id.  The Court simply responded 
that the measures ordered would not make the victims richer or poorer.  Id. ¶ 450.  
For further cases of states arguing against extensive reparations orders, See Rosendo 
Cantú v. Mexico, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 216, ¶ 205 (Aug. 31, 2010); Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, 
Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 215, ¶ 222 (Aug. 30, 2010); Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42 ¶ 145 (Nov. 27, 1998); Compare 
Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 45.  The Court itself requires 
that the reparations have a causal nexus with the human rights violation.  See, e.g., 
Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 251, ¶ 241 (Oct. 24, 2012) (recognizing that the 
Court’s reparations must have a causal nexus with the facts, violations, harm, and 
damage of the case); Atala Riffo v. Chile, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239, ¶ 242 (Feb. 24, 2012) (recognizing that the 
Court’s reparations must have a causal nexus with the facts, violations, harm, and 
damage of the case). 
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as the payment of compensation for the damage caused.”13  The 
Court has failed to use explicit legal principles to sufficiently explain 
when and why extraordinary reparation orders might be legitimate.  
The Court’s aggressive use of extraordinary reparations orders, 
which has triggered state complaints concerning their legitimacy, is 
perhaps natural given the limited number of new contentious cases 
the Court resolves annually—between nine and nineteen in recent 
years.14  It directly reviews only a small portion of all the alleged 
human rights violations that occur in the states subject to its juris-
diction, sharply limiting its direct control of state actions and omis-
sions.15  This fact provides a powerful incentive for the Court to ad-
dress human rights violations in the Americas other than by 
imposing accountability in individual cases.  One temptation is to 
promote deeper changes in the states and their societies through os-
tensible exercises of the reparations power that the American Con-
vention concedes to the Court.16  Although states do not fully com-
ply with the reparations that the Court orders, they comply at 
sufficiently high rates that the use of these orders as a tool for social 
change may seem quite appealing.17  To promote positive change, 
the Court has ordered human rights training for state officials, 
changes to certain institutional structures, and amendments to leg-
islation as extraordinary reparations for the victims of human rights 
violations.18  But, as desirable as these supposedly reparative 
                                                     
13 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 450. 
14 See Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Decisions and Judgments, 
http://www.corteidh.or.cr/index.php/en/decisions-and-judgments 
[http://perma.cc/V2HF-FSWR] (last visited Oct. 10, 2014)  (demonstrating the lim-
ited number of cases tried annually before the Court). 
15 Cf. David L. Attanasio, Militarized Criminal Organizations in Latin America and 
Human Rights Court Oversight of State Protection Efforts: Evidence from Colombia, 41 
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 341, 375-81 (2014) (noting a jurisprudence principle that “allows 
the courts to use their limited judicial competence efficiently to promote compli-
ance with the state human rights obligation to protect by focusing resources on 
those issues most in need of their intervention”). 
16 See Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1) (“If the Court finds that there has 
been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall 
rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that 
was violated.”). 
17 See Antkowiak, supra note 1, at 304-16 (demonstrating “that states have com-
plied with the Inter-American Court’s reparations orders across a range of catego-
ries.”). 
18 See, e.g., Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 269-
70, 272 (noting the efficacy and impact of the human rights education program for 
public officials); Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 285 (ordering 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
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measures may be given the Court’s limitations, the states might have 
a point when they complain about their illegitimacy, in particular, 
that the Court may not have the necessary legal authority to order 
these measures. 
Nevertheless, this Article will argue that it is possible to provide 
an adequate response to state complaints about extraordinary repa-
rations orders.  By focusing on three unacknowledged aspects of hu-
man rights violations and their resulting harms, it is possible to 
show why the Inter-American Court’s major extraordinary repara-
tions orders are legally legitimate.  First, many extraordinary repa-
rations orders are not actually mandates to provide reparations, but 
rather legitimate orders to cease ongoing human rights violations.  
For example, in Atala Riffo v. Chile, the Court held that Chile violated 
the American Convention when it deprived a woman of child cus-
tody on the basis of her sexual orientation.19  It then ordered, in ad-
dition to monetary compensation, changes to Chilean legal practice 
and non-discrimination training for public officials.20  Reparations 
orders of this sort might be understood as orders to eliminate laws, 
practices, and states of affairs that, in themselves, constitute viola-
tions of the American Convention.  The American Convention ex-
plicitly gives the Court the power to order that “the injured party be 
ensured the enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.”21  
When existing laws, practices, and states of affairs continue to vio-
late state obligations, ensuring enjoyment of rights may require such 
extraordinary measures.  The Court may legitimately order cessa-
tion of such violations for the same reasons that a domestic court 
may legitimately invalidate an unconstitutional law or practice in a 
case where the law or practice was applied and generated a consti-
tutional violation.  
Second, the Court may legitimately order extraordinary repara-
tions to repair victim trust in the state that the human rights viola-
tion damaged, an effort that will often require more than simply 
                                                     
the implementation of a public program to rescue, promote, disseminate, and con-
serve ancestral customs and practices of the Río Negro community); Atala Riffo v. 
Chile, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 271-72 (recognizing the State’s advances in training pro-
grams for public officials); González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at 
¶¶ 541, 543 (ordering the continued implementation of training programs for pub-
lic officials, including topics such as discrimination against women). 
19 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 146, 154-55. 
20 Id. at ¶¶ 271, 284, 294, 299. 
21 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
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eliminating the material effects of the violation.22 Apologies, recog-
nition of responsibility, construction of monuments or museums, 
and creation of commemorative days may serve this purpose, for 
example.  However, the reparations that are appropriate means to 
rebuild trust and thereby promote reconciliation depend on the so-
cial context of the victim, such as whether the victim was subject to 
discrimination on the basis of some characteristic like ethnicity, gen-
der, or sexual orientation.  These factors affect what measures are 
sufficient to restore the victim’s trust that the state will treat him or 
her appropriately and that it will not commit future human rights 
violations. 23  For victims that were subject to social marginalization, 
such as in the form of discrimination, repair may require additional 
measures, potentially with greater cost.  Reparations that merely 
seek to eliminate the consequences of the human rights violations 
may be insufficient; restoring the victim’s trust may require 
measures that attempt to change the social circumstances of the vic-
tim or otherwise improve his or her material situation. 
Finally, extraordinary reparations’ orders may legitimately seek 
to eliminate, repair, or compensate for the consequences of past hu-
man rights violations for a community, rather than for individuals.  
Even though the ordered measures may appear disconnected from 
the past violations because restitution, compensation, or rehabilita-
tion (medical or psychological treatment) have already been 
awarded to individual victims, such extraordinary reparations or-
ders may be legitimate nevertheless.  For example, Rio Negro Massa-
cres v. Guatemala concerned several villages subject to massacres and 
forced displacement, many of whose residents resettled in the town 
of Pacux.24  The Court ordered that the state implement a number of 
measures to improve life in Pacux, including provision of medical 
personnel for a health center, food security programs, improved 
                                                     
22 A human rights violation not only causes injury to the material interests of 
the victim, but also to the appropriate trust that should exist between an individual 
and his or her state.  As a result, reparations need to respond not only to the material 
harm—economic losses, incurred expenses, pain and suffering, and the like—but 
also to the loss of trust. 
23 Human rights violations concretely demonstrate to individuals that the state 
is not to be trusted to treat them according to acceptable standards because it does 
not adequately respect them.  See infra Part IV. 
24 Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 68-87. 
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streets, supply of water, drainage and sewers, and improved school-
ing facilities.25  One way to understand the collective measures in 
this case is as an attempt to repair the damage to the social fabric of 
the community that the massacres and displacement caused.  Even 
if the required reparations for individuals were sufficient to elimi-
nate the individual effects of past human rights violations, the Court 
may legitimately order additional measures to restore (or to attempt 
to restore) community cohesion.  
In responding to state complaints about extraordinary repara-
tions orders, this Article uses the Inter-American Court’s jurispru-
dence to develop a broad legal theory of reparations.26  The Inter-
American Court has expanded on traditional reparations in interna-
tional law, identifying an extensive set of potential reparatory 
measures for human rights violations committed against individu-
als.27  Demonstrating the legitimacy of the Inter-American Court’s 
                                                     
25 Id. at ¶ 284. 
26 This theoretical proposal may also be relevant to the design of reparations 
programs, such as for societies in transition to democracy.  See generally RUTI G. 
TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 1-11 (2002); NEIL J. KRITZ, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE: HOW 
EMERGING DEMOCRACIES RECKON WITH FORMER REGIMES, VOLUME I: GENERAL 
CONSIDERATIONS 1-55 (1995).  For many such societies, a narrow focus on fully ‘un-
doing’ or eliminating the material consequences of past human rights violations 
simply is not reasonable.  Such societies must use their limited resources to attend 
to reconstruction and reduction of social inequality, while at the same time redress-
ing past human rights violations.  See Christopher Kutz, Justice in Reparations: The 
Cost of Memory and the Value of Talk, 32 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 277, 278-79, 298 (2004).  
In this context, there is typically a dilemma between the reparations called for by 
corrective justice theories and the limited public resources available and other ur-
gent social spending.  See David Gray, An Excuse-Centered Approach to Transitional 
Justice, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2621, 2626; MARGARET URBAN WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: 
RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELATIONS AFTER WRONGDOING 36 (2006) [hereafter MORAL 
REPAIR]; Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations Decisions and Dilemmas, 27 HASTINGS INT’L 
& COMP. L. REV. 157, 185-192 (2003); Pablo De Greiff, International Courts and Transi-
tions to Democracy, 12 PUB. AFF. Q. 79, 79-80 (1998).  A number of authors have con-
sidered how reparations ought to be designed in light of such tensions, a project 
that would benefit from an expanded understanding of reparations.  See Kutz, infra, 
at 278-79, 298; Pablo Kalmanovitz, Corrective Justice versus Social Justice in the After-
math of War, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN TRANSITIONS 71, 79-91 (Morton Bergsmo et al. 
eds., 2010); Rodrigo Uprimny Yepes, Between Corrective and Distributive Justice: Rep-
arations of Gross Human Rights Violations in Times of Transition 19-21 (lecture deliv-
ered October 21, 2009); Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the Reparations Program in 
South Africa, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS 176, 191-92, 201–02 (Pablo De Greiff 
ed., 2006).  Jon Elster observes that dilemmas of this sort are quite common in tran-
sitional contexts, not just currently but from a historical perspective as well. JON 
ELSTER, CLOSING THE BOOKS: TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 208-15 
(2004). 
27 There are potentially substantial differences between reparations for human 
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creative jurisprudence requires identifying an expansive theory of 
reparations for human rights violations.  Having such a theory is 
especially valuable because both international jurisprudence from 
other tribunals28 and international soft law take guidance from the 
Inter-American Court’s novel and expansive approach to repara-
tions.29  Because the Court’s perspective on reparations has become 
increasingly influential, it is important to have a clear understand-
ing of when and why its extraordinary reparations orders are legally 
justified. 
This Article will proceed in five additional substantive sections 
to defend a theory of the legitimacy of the Inter-American Court’s 
extraordinary reparations’ orders.  The next section will present an 
overview of the Court’s reparations decisions and identify certain 
recurring reparations orders that may appear illegitimate because 
they do not seem to constitute genuine reparations.  The third sec-
tion will explain why many Inter-American extraordinary repara-
tions’ orders, particularly guarantees of non-repetition, may in fact 
be disguised orders to cease ongoing human rights violations.  The 
                                                     
rights violations and reparations for other international law violations.  See Theo 
van Boven, Victims’ Rights to a Remedy and Reparation: The New United Nations Prin-
ciples and Guidelines, in REPARATIONS FOR VICTIMS OF GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES AND 
CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY 19, 20-21 (Carla Ferstman et al eds., 2009). 
28 See, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. Congo), 2012 I.C.J. 
324, at ¶¶ 13, 18, 20, 40 (June 19, 2012); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Guinea v. Dem. Rep. 
Congo), 2012 I.C.J. 347, at ¶¶ 65-70 (June 19, 2012) (separate opinion of Judge Can-
çado Trindade); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision estab-
lishing the principles and procedures to be applied to reparations, at ¶¶ 186-249 
(Aug. 7, 2012); Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, Case No. ICC-01/05-01/08, at ¶ 82 (Jul. 
12, 2010) (noting an individual’s right to a remedy and reparations); Extraordinary 
Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, Prosecutor v. Kaing Guek Eav alias Duch, 
Case No. 001/18-07-2007-ECCC/SC, Appeal Judgment (Feb. 3 2012); Ethiopia’s 
Damages Claims (Eth. v. Eri.), Final Award, Eri. Eth. Cl. Comm’n, at ¶ 62 (Aug. 17, 
2009) (discussing the notion of comparative criminal responsibility in relation to the 
party “most responsible”); Srebrenica Cases, Case No. CH/01/8365, Decision on 
Admissibility and Merits, Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina ¶¶ 
205-210 (Mar. 7, 2003) (noting the difficulty in fashioning a remedy for particularly 
egregious human rights violations). 
29 Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation 
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious 
Violations of International Humanitarian Law, General Assembly Resolution 
60/147, Annex, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147, at ¶¶ 15-23 (Dec. 16, 2005) available at 
http://www.hrc.ba/DATABASE/decisions/CH01-8365%20Selimovic 
%20Admissibility%20and%20Merits%20E.pd [perma.cc/RDS4-RTU9] (last visited 
Jan. 16, 2016). 
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fourth section will claim that many other typical extraordinary rep-
arations orders, especially measures of satisfaction, may be viewed 
as legitimately aimed at repairing the victim’s trust in the state 
harmed by the past human rights violation.  It will explain why the 
victim’s social context—specifically social marginalization—may 
justify orders to grant additional reparative measures that are sym-
bolic but also provide material benefits to the victim.  The fifth sec-
tion will argue that orders to provide reparations aimed at commu-
nities may be legitimate because they seek to repair the harm from 
the human rights violation to the fabric and structure of the commu-
nity.  
2.  INTER-AMERICAN REPARATIONS AND THE PROBLEM OF 
LEGITIMACY 
The Inter-American Court’s reparations jurisprudence includes 
several categories of orders that are relatively unproblematic, but 
others—which might be called extraordinary reparations—that are 
not obviously legitimate.  Extraordinary reparations orders require 
states to, for example, change laws, provide human rights training, 
or improve infrastructure.  These orders appear to be illegitimate 
because they do not seem to be orders to provide genuine repara-
tions, which are measures that respond to the particular past human 
rights violation committed against the specific victim.  The Ameri-
can Convention only authorizes the Court to order reparations and 
measures to ensure the victim’s rights, not just set forth any measure 
that the Court thinks might make for improved human rights com-
pliance or a better society.  If a supposed reparations order does not 
require genuine reparations, or is not otherwise legally authorized 
by the Convention, it would constitute an illegitimate excess of au-
thority.  This section will first provide an overview of the Inter-
American Court’s reparations jurisprudence, then identify several 
requirements for genuine reparations, and finally explain why some 
principal categories of reparations orders appear illegitimate. 
2.1. The Reparations Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court 
The Inter-American Court’s power to order reparations ulti-
mately stems from article 63(1) of the American Convention: 
If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or 
freedom protected by this Convention, the Court shall rule 
that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right 
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or freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, 
that the consequences of the measure or situation that con-
stituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and 
that fair compensation be paid to the injured party.30 
 According to the Court, this article embodies the customary in-
ternational law of state responsibility, which requires a state to pro-
vide reparations for its internationally unlawful acts.31  The Court 
has interpreted this provision to authorize and require a state to or-
der integral reparations for human rights violations.  Integral repa-
rations consist of measures sufficient to undo the violation—restor-
ing the situation prior to the violation—and eliminate its 
consequences to the extent feasible, as well as to provide complete 
compensation for whatever aspects cannot be undone or elimi-
nated.32  The integral reparation standard requires that all repara-
tory measures have a causal nexus with the human rights violation, 
in that they respond to it and undo, eliminate, or compensate for its 
effects.33  It also implies that that the Court must not order double 
reparation, in that the reparations taken as a whole must be no more 
than integral.34  
Nonetheless, the requirement that reparations be integral, ac-
cording to the Court, allows not only for measures that restore the 
situation prior to a human rights violation, but also for measures 
that otherwise correct that situation.  The Court explained in Atala 
Riffo, a case concerning a woman deprived of child custody because 
of her sexual orientation: 
                                                     
30 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
31 Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 88, ¶ 40 (Dec. 31, 2001); Castillo Páez v. Peru, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 43, ¶ 50 (Nov. 27, 1998); Aloeboetoe 
v. Suriname, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 15, 
¶ 43 (Sept. 10, 1993). 
32 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12 (“The Court recalls that 
the concept of ‘integral reparation’ (restitutio in integrum) entails the re-establish-
ment of the previous situation and the elimination of the effects produced by the 
violation, as well as the payment of compensation for the damage caused.”).  See 
also Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. C) No. 7, ¶ 26 (July 21, 1989) (awarding compensation, both monetary and 
moral, to the victim’s next of kin in the amount intended to restore the situation 
prior to the violation). 
33 Mendoza v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, and Reparations, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 260, ¶ 306 (May 14, 2013). 
34 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 450. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
 
2016] EXTRAORDINARY REPARATIONS 825 
 
[S]ome discriminatory acts analyzed . . . relate to the perpet-
uation of stereotypes that are associated with the structural 
and historical discrimination suffered by sexual minorities . 
. . . Therefore, some reparations must have a transformative 
purpose, in order to produce both a restorative and correc-
tive effect and promote structural changes . . . .35 
Thus, while the Court limits integral reparations to those 
measures causally connected to the violation, the measures must re-
pair or compensate for all damage resulting from all identified hu-
man rights violations—taking into account gender and other rele-
vant social distinctions—as well as eliminate the structural causes of 
the human rights violations, thereby giving the reparations a trans-
formative purpose.36  The requirement that reparations have a trans-
formative purpose does not authorize reparations that would make 
the victims richer or poorer than they otherwise would have been, 
but instead requires the Court to address the underlying causes of 
human rights violations.37 
The Court distinguishes six categories of reparations.  First, alt-
hough not strictly reparations, it can order measures that require the 
investigation of ongoing human rights violations, including their 
prosecution and punishment.38  Second, when appropriate and pos-
                                                     
35 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 267.  See also González (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12 (ordering a new investigation of the victim’s gen-
der-related murder without the preexisting legal or factual obstacles and with a 
gender perspective in order to avoid a repetition of the result).  
36 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 451 (ruling that the 
Court shall “assess the measures of reparation requested by the Commission and 
the representatives to ensure that they: (i) refer directly to the violations declared 
by the Tribunal; (ii) repair the pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage proportion-
ately; (iii) do not make the beneficiaries richer or poorer; (iv) restore the victims to 
their situation prior to the violation insofar as possible, to the extent that this does 
not interfere with the obligation not to discriminate; (v) are designed to identify 
and eliminate the factors that cause discrimination; (vi) are adopted from a gender 
perspective, bearing in mind the different impact that violence has on men and on 
women, and (vii) take into account all the juridical acts and actions in the case file 
which, according to the State, tend to repair the damage caused.”). 
37 Id. at ¶ 450. 
38 See, e.g., id. § IX(3) (Nov. 16, 2009); García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mex-
ico, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 273, 
¶ 70 (Nov. 26, 2013) (demonstrating approval of a friendly settlement); Mendoza v. 
Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶¶ 340-41 (deciding to investigate the death publically 
and with access by the family); Gudiel Álvarez ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 253, ¶ 350 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
826 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
sible, the Court will require restitution, in the sense of the literal re-
turn to the situation prior to the human rights violation, usually in 
connection to the restoration of legal rights.39  Third, compensation 
takes the form of monetary reparations for pecuniary and non-pe-
cuniary losses as a result of the human rights violation.40  Fourth, if 
the victim continues to suffer physical or psychological effects from 
the violation, the Court will often require the state to provide repa-
rations, like medical or psychological care, as measures of rehabilita-
tion.41  Fifth, the category of satisfaction includes measures such as 
                                                     
(Nov. 20, 2012) (imposing the obligation to investigate the forced disappearances 
and the alleged detentions, torture, and presumed execution of victims); Fornerón 
and Daughter v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 242, ¶ 172 (April 27, 2012) (ordering an investigation and sanc-
tioning officials as a means of non-repetition). 
39 See, e.g., Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 238, ¶ 105 (Nov. 29, 2011) (ordering 
reparations to compensate a victim whose right to freedom of expression was vio-
lated); Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 248, ¶¶ 264-66 (Sept. 3, 2012) 
(awarding reparations to a victim who was attacked while filming a protest demon-
stration); García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mexico, supra note 38, at ¶ 73 
(awarding reparations to two men who were detained and tortured and sentenced 
to further terms of imprisonment without due process); Osorio Rivera v. Peru, Pre-
liminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 274, ¶ 
83 (Nov. 26, 2013) (ordering reparations to compensate a victim who was unlaw-
fully detained and tortured). 
40 See, e.g., J. v. Peru, Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, 
Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 275, ¶ 415 (Nov. 27, 2013) (awarding monetary rep-
arations to a victim who was illegally and arbitrarily detained, raped, and tortured 
and whose home was illegally searched); Mémoli v. Argentina, Preliminary Objec-
tions, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 265, 
¶¶ 213, 218 (Aug. 22, 2013) (awarding monetary reparations to compensate a victim 
whose right to freedom of expression was violated). 
41 The Inter-American Court orders these measures with some frequency, typ-
ically in the form of medical or psychological attention for the victim.  It commonly 
requires the state to provide medical attention to victims with remaining health 
problems resulting from the human rights violation.  Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra 
note 39, at ¶ 256; Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 311; Vélez Restrepo v. 
Colombia, supra note 39, at ¶¶ 270-71.  It also requires the state to provide funds to 
victims, such as when direct provision of care was not feasible.  Suárez Peralta v. 
Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 261, ¶ 183-84 (May 21, 2013); Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia, 
supra note 39, at ¶¶ 270-71 (requiring direct provision only if the victims return to 
Colombia and funds for health care otherwise).  But cf. Pacheco Tineo Family v. 
Bolivia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 272, ¶ 260 (Nov. 25, 2013) (denying provision of funds 
because the harm was not causally connected to the human rights violation).  Per-
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public apologies or recognition of responsibility for the human 
rights violation.  Sixth, guarantees of non-repetition are measures in-
tended to preclude the recurrence of the human rights violation per-
petrated. 
It is worth saying more about the two categories of reparations 
that typically include extraordinary measures, which do not appear 
aimed at undoing, repairing, or compensating for the harm suffered 
or at ceasing ongoing violations.  These categories are guarantees of 
non-repetition and satisfaction.  As guarantees of non-repetition, the 
Inter-American Court requires states to “adopt all the necessary le-
gal, administrative and any other measures to make the exercise of 
these rights effective . . . .”42  It claims that these reparations originate 
                                                     
haps even more common are requirements to provide psychological care for vic-
tims, again typically in the form of services, not funds.  See e.g., Osorio Rivera v. 
Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 256 (ordering that the Peruvian government provide med-
ical and psychological or psychiatric treatment to those victims who request it); 
Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 224 (ordering that the Honduran gov-
ernment provide free, immediate, appropriate and effective psychological or psy-
chiatric care, as required to the victims); Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 254 
(ordering that the government of Chile provide medical and psychological or psy-
chiatric care, free of charge and in an immediate, appropriate and effective manner 
to those victims who so request it); Barrios Family v. Venezuela, supra note 5, at ¶ 
330 (deciding that the state of Venezuala must provide medical and psychological 
care, free of charge and immediately, to the victims who request it).  In cases where 
the issue was raised or problems were likely, the Court has also required the state 
to take into account special circumstances of victims.  Gudiel Álvarez ("Diario Mil-
itar") v. Guatemala, supra note 38, at ¶ 339.  See also Río Negro Massacres v. Guate-
mala, supra note 8, at ¶ 289 (instituting psychological care to be provided to the 
affected community).  Finally, the Court has also occasionally ordered educational 
services for victims in cases where the human rights violation interfered with the 
victim’s pursuit of education, and affected his or her life project more generally, 
understood as opportunities for personal development.  Mendoza v. Argentina, su-
pra note 33, at ¶¶ 314-17; Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 147-52. 
42 Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 165.  See also Luna López v. Hon-
duras, supra note 3, at ¶ 234; Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 195 (or-
dering several legal and administrative measures in order to prevent repletion of 
the violation); Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Ob-
jections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
257, ¶ 334 (Nov. 28, 2013) (ordering the state of Costa Rica to adopt appropriate 
legal and practical measures to annul to the prohibition to practice in vitro fertili-
zation); Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 323 (ordering the state of Argen-
tina to adapt its legal framework to the international standards for juvenile criminal 
justice and design and implement public policies with clear goals and timetables 
for the prevention of juvenile delinquency through effective programs and ser-
vices); Furlan v. Argentina, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, 
Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 246, ¶ 300 (Aug. 31, 2012) (ordering the 
state of Argentina to adopt the measures necessary to ensure that as soon as a per-
son is diagnosed with serious problems or consequences related to a disability, that 
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in the state’s obligation to prevent and guarantee human rights as 
established by the American Convention.43  The measures necessary 
to make rights effective as guarantees of non-repetition are often 
limited to those that respond to a situation that actually generated 
the violations in the case.44  When proposed measures involve 
changing laws, the Court has often taken into account whether the 
law complies with international standards when deciding whether 
to grant the measures.45  The Court considers it particularly im-
portant to provide guarantees of non-repetition when the human 
rights violations at issue are part of a recurring pattern.46 
The Inter-American Court has ordered a range of reparation 
measures as guarantees of non-repetition for the human rights vio-
lations suffered.  First, it has required that the state provide human 
rights training for different groups, including the armed forces,47 the 
police,48 prison officials,49 executive and judicial officials,50 and even 
the general public.51  The training may be on the general topic of 
respect for human rights or humanitarian law,52 or on more specific 
                                                     
person or his family shall be provided with a charter of rights that summarizes the 
benefits provided under Argentine legislation). 
43 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39 at, ¶ 268; Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra 
note 2, at ¶ 165; Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 234; Suárez Peralta v. 
Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 195; Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, 
supra note 42, at ¶ 334; Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 323; Furlan v. 
Argentina, supra note 42, at ¶ 300. 
44 Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42, at ¶ 301 (“the representatives did not 
provide sufficient evidence to allow the Court to infer that the violations declared 
in this case stem from a problem in the laws themselves.”). 
45 Id. at ¶ 301; Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, supra note 41, at ¶ 266; Luna 
López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 238; Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) 
v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 268, ¶ 276 (Aug. 28, 2013); Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra 
note 12, at ¶ 280. 
46 Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 92. 
47 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 274; Gomes Lund ("Guerrilha do 
Araguaia") v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 219, ¶ 283 (Nov. 24, 2010). 
48 Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 168; Barrios Family v. Venezuela, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 341. 
49 Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 337. 
50 Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42, at ¶ 308; Fornerón and Daughter v. Ar-
gentina, supra note 38, at ¶ 182. 
51 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 541, 543. 
52 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 274; Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra 
note 2, at ¶ 168. 
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topics, such as non-discrimination or forced disappearance.53  Sec-
ond, the Court has often ordered the state to change different aspects 
of its law and public policy, including the creation of laws concern-
ing protections for criminal defendants,54 the addition of crimes to 
penal codes,55 the amendment of other laws,56 and the development 
of new public policy.57  Third, the Court has required prison reforms, 
such as improvement of general prison conditions,58 elimination of 
specific hazards to prisoners,59 separation of different populations,60 
and expanding the availability of health services.61  
Measures of satisfaction, in the Inter-American Court’s jurispru-
dence, “seek to repair non-pecuniary” or non-material damage62 and 
are “public acts or works that seek, inter alia, to commemorate and 
                                                     
53 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 274; Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 
42, at ¶ 803; Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 271-72; González (“Cotton 
Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 541, 543. 
54 See Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 100 (limiting preliminary 
detention); Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 327 (prohibiting life impris-
onment). 
55 For example, several cases have required states to criminalize forced disap-
pearances as such.  Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 271; Gutiérrez v. Ar-
gentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 231; Gomes Lund ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, 
supra note 47, at ¶ 287. 
56 Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 332 (ordering conventionality con-
trol by judges). 
57 Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 244 (providing a comprehensive 
policy for protection for human rights and environment advocates); Gomes Lund 
("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, supra note 47, at ¶ 297 (commending, but not 
explicitly ordering, the creation of truth commission); Gomes Lund ("Guerrilha do 
Araguaia") v. Brazil, supra note 47, at ¶ 292 (noting reforms necessary for access to 
information).  
58 Díaz-Peña v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 244, ¶ 154 (Jun. 26, 2012) (ordering, 
at a minimum, well ventilated cells, access to bathrooms and clean showers, and 
decent quality food); Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 96. 
59 Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 96 (ordering that the risk of 
fire in a prison be mitigated).  
60 Id. ¶ 97. 
61 Díaz-Peña v. Venezuela, supra note 58, at ¶ 154; Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, 
supra note 4, at ¶ 96. 
62 Goiburú v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 153, ¶ 163 (Sept. 26, 2013).  Accord Afro-descendant Commu-
nities Displaced from the Cacarica River Basin (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, 
Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 270, ¶ 441 (Nov. 20, 2013); Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 
Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 140, ¶ 
264 (Jan. 31, 2006). 
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dignify victims . . . .” 63  The most commonly ordered measures of 
satisfaction require the state to distribute and publicize the Inter-
American Court’s judgment64 and perform public acts of recognition 
of international responsibility.65  Judgments may also include a re-
quirement to apologize publically.66  Beyond these standard 
measures of satisfaction, there are a number of others that the Court 
has ordered on occasion.  For example, it has ordered the state to 
name schools in commemoration of children who suffered serious 
human rights violations.67  It has approved of the state’s willingness 
                                                     
63 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶ 191 (June 15, 2005); 
Serrano Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 120, ¶ 156 (March 1, 2005); Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. 
Guatemala, Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 116, ¶ 80 (Nov. 
19, 2004).  See also Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R. (ser. C) No. 132, ¶ 105 (Sept. 12, 2005) (ordering one such 
public act: the State publishing the Court’s judgment in an official gazette and na-
tional newspaper). 
64 See, e.g., Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 260 (providing instructions 
on how the judgment should be published); see also Díaz-Peña v. Venezuela, supra 
note 58, at ¶ 153 (detailing dissemination and publishing requirements to be in com-
pliance with the court order); Escher v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Rep-
arations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 200, ¶ 239 (July 6, 
2009); Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 133, ¶ 136 (Sept. 15, 2005); Bulacio v. Argentina, Merits, 
Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 100, ¶ 145 (Sept. 
18, 2013). 
65 See, e.g., Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 158 (encouraging Argen-
tina to organize it’s public act of recognition for responsibility with the guidance of 
affected victims);  Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 122 (insisting that 
the victims’ next of kin should attend the public acknowledgment of responsibility); 
Montero Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Preliminary Objec-
tion, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 150, 
¶ 150 (July 5, 2006) (finding Venezuela’s acceptance of liability at the hearing insuf-
ficient for a public acknowledgment and ordering  new act of public acknowledge-
ment in front of victims’ next of kin).  But see Escher v. Brazil, supra note 64, at ¶ 243 
(finding that a public act of acknowledgment was not necessary within the context 
of the case). 
66 See Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertilization) v. Costa Rica, supra note 42, at ¶ 85 
(demonstrating a court-approved settlement including a requirement to apologize); 
Nogueira de Carvalho v. Brazil, Preliminary Objections and Merits, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 161, ¶ 189 (Nov. 28, 2006). 
67 E.g., Contreras v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, In-
ter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 232, ¶ 208 (Aug. 31, 2011) (ordering the state to name 
schools for forced disappearance victims); see also “Street Children” (Villagrán-Mo-
rales) v. Guatemala, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 77, ¶ 457 (May 26, 2001) (acknowledging state’s efforts prior to the judgment to 
improve educational assistance to communities).  Cf. Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra 
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to construct a museum dedicated to an armed conflict and its vic-
tims68 and to preserve the site of the violations.69  In one case, it re-
quired the state to distribute a documentary that the state acqui-
esced to producing.70 
 The Court also frequently classifies as measures of satisfaction 
a number of reparations that are not purely symbolic in nature, in 
that they have substantial material components as well.  Perhaps the 
most notable orders in this category require the state to provide in-
frastructure for displaced communities, including health care, ac-
cess to food, improvement of streets, improved sewers, better access 
to water, and better schools.71  Similarly, on a number of occasions, 
the Court has ordered the state to provide educational support for 
the children of victims whose studies were affected by the human 
rights violation.72  In at least one decision, it also ordered the provi-
                                                     
note 2, at ¶ 164 (approving of the establishment of a “National Day to Combat 
Drug-trafficking”).  But see Gomes Lund ("Guerrilha do Araguaia") v. Brazil, supra 
note 47, at ¶ 280 (denying request for a commemorative day). 
68 E.g., Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 280 (acknowledg-
ing state’s acquiescence to initiatives to construct a museum in memory of victims 
of the internal conflict). 
69 See Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 162 (approving of settlement, 
including agreements to take efforts to preserve “the warehouse and precinct where 
the events occurred”). 
70 See Contreras v. El Salvador, supra note 67, at ¶ 210 (ordering the state to 
cover the preparation and expenses of a documentary on forced disappearance of 
children).  But see Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, 
supra note 62, at ¶ 450 (denying reparations in the form of a documentary).  
71 See Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 284 (recognizing 
the instability of displaced victims by ordering public works such as a improve-
ments to a health center, food security and nutrition programs, reconstruction of 
schools, establishment of a bilingual high school, and other construction efforts).  
The court has replicated nearly the same order on other occasions where it did not 
specify whether it was a measure of satisfaction or a guarantee of non-repetition 
and on one occasion where the Court categorized the order as a measure of reha-
bilitation.  Compare Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 
7, at ¶ 301 (classifying the order as rehabilitation); Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Com-
munity v. Paraguay, supra note 6, at ¶ 230 (classifying the order as satisfaction or 
guarantees); Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 125, ¶ 221 (June 17, 2005) (clas-
sified as satisfaction or guarantees). 
72 See Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 267 (requiring the state to es-
tablish schools); see also, Barrios Family v. Venezuela, supra note 5, at ¶ 336 (Nov. 
24, 2011) (ordering that the State provide scholarships to members to enumerated 
victims for their university education); Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at 
¶¶ 145-48. 
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sion of education for the mother of the victim, whose search for jus-
tice was impeded by her illiteracy.73  In another case, the Court en-
dorsed various material measures of satisfaction that would “con-
tribute to establish[ing] the conditions and means to enable the 
victims to restore their dignity” following fifteen years in prison.74  
These measures included the provision of housing and educational 
support.75  Finally, it is worth noting that the Court has on occasion 
ordered measures like human rights training or medical and psy-
chological care as measures of satisfaction rather than as guarantees 
of non-repetition or measures of rehabilitation.76 
2.2. Traditional Corrective Justice and Requirements for Genuine 
Reparations 
Before analyzing the extent to which the Inter-American Court’s 
reparations—most importantly, extraordinary measures—can be 
understood as genuine reparations, it is worth saying more about 
the traditional conception of corrective justice and what it indicates 
about the nature of reparations in general.  Corrective justice in the 
reparations context requires a state to correct past wrongs, classi-
cally understood as an attempt to undo, eliminate, or compensate 
for the material consequences of a past wrong.77  In that sense, it is a 
backwards-looking ideal of justice,78 in contrast to distributive jus-
tice, which focuses on the just distribution of economic and other 
resources in the present.79  Some conception of corrective justice is 
                                                     
73 See Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶ 147 (ordering that the State 
provide any resources necessary to improve victim’s literacy skills).  
74 García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mexico, supra note 38, at ¶ 80. 
75 Id. at ¶¶ 80, 83. 
76 See, e.g., Montero Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, supra 
note 65, at ¶ 148 (directing Venezuela to design training programs for its police and 
penitentiary officials); see also Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶ 143 (or-
dering that the State provide mental and psychological help to those who are 
mourning the loss of their disappeared family member). 
77 ERNEST WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 142-44 (1995); JULES L. COLEMAN, 
RISKS AND WRONGS 322 (1992); ARTHUR RIPSTEIN, EQUALITY RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE 
LAW 24, 30, 35 (1999). For a critical discussion of the corrective justice perspective, 
see Margaret Urban Walker, Restorative Justice and Reparations, 37 J. SOC. PHIL. 377, 
379-82, 385 (2006) [hereinafter Restorative Justice and Reparations]. 
78 Kalmanovitz, supra note 26, at 75.  
79 Distributive justice in turn requires either that social institutions appropri-
ately distribute or that society achieve an appropriate distribution of material re-
sources among its members.  See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 76-77 (2d 
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often thought to underlie the law of torts, which generally seeks to 
have the tortfeasor compensate the injured party for the harm 
wrongfully caused.80  A corrective justice perspective often assumes 
that there is a secondary duty to correct the harm done to others as 
a result of a breach of the primary duties owed to them, such as the 
duty not to injure wrongfully.81  This secondary duty to correct is 
not solely based on responsibility for the breach itself but on a notion 
of responsibility for certain outcomes or results of the breach.82 
The secondary duty to correct may potentially take different 
forms, including a duty to undo the violation and eliminate its ef-
fects to the degree possible, or a duty to compensate for the wrong 
and its consequences.  The distinction between these duties is im-
portant because, in general, a duty to undo or eliminate the violation 
and its consequences and a duty to compensate make sense in dif-
ferent circumstances.  A duty to undo or eliminate the violation and 
its consequences makes sense only in those circumstances where it 
is possible to do so.83  For example, if the wrong involved the state 
                                                     
ed., 1999).  Concerns of distributive justice regarding material resources may moti-
vate various social programs, such as those related to the reduction or elimination 
of poverty and those that attempt to provide members of society with food and 
housing.  See, e.g., Maria Paula Saffon & Rodrigo Uprimny, Distributive Justice and 
the Restitution of Dispossessed Land in Colombia, in DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE IN 
TRANSITIONS 399-403 (Morten Bergsmo et al. eds., 2010) (explaining the differences 
between reparations, a state’s social policy, and humanitarian assistance and the 
unique legal sources of these three state acts); Uprimny Yepes, supra note 26, at 15-
18.  Because distributive justice is concerned with the existing distribution of mate-
rial and other resources and altering that distribution in the future, it may be un-
derstood to constitute either a present- or future-oriented notion of justice.  Kalma-
novitz, supra note 26, at 76-77. 
80 Of course, the economic analysis of tort law would provide a different anal-
ysis.  See generally RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (8th ed., 2010). 
81 See, e.g, WEINRIB, supra note 77, at 143; COLEMAN, supra note 77, at 324 (ex-
plaining that the law generally takes harm caused into account).  However, while 
corrective justice requires that the responsible party correct the harm if no one else 
steps in to do so, it is compatible with payments by third parties.  See, e.g, COLEMAN, 
supra note 77, at 324; see also Stephen Perry, Responsibility for Outcome, Risk, and 
the Law of Torts, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE LAW OF TORTS 72, 72-74 (Gerald Postema 
ed., 2001) (explaining the crux of corrective justice is making the harmed party 
whole, not punishing the wrongdoer). 
82 This feature is required, in part, to explain why strict tort liability—liability 
for harm without fault—is coherent.  
83 Repair in general does not imply an attempt to roll back the clock, returning 
to how things were prior to the violation, but instead requires actions that depend 
on the context of repair.  See Restorative Justice and Reparations, supra note 77, at 384; 
see also Barbara Herman, Morality Unbounded, 36 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 323, 354-55 (2008) 
(distinguishing material repair, which is not always possible, from moral repair). 
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removing the right to custody of a child, its effects can be partly 
eliminated by restoring the right to custody.  The psychological ef-
fects of torture might be partly eliminated or combated though psy-
chological care.  However, in some circumstances, it is not possible 
to undo or eliminate the consequences of a wrong.  For example, it 
is not possible to eliminate lost time together resulting from the dep-
rivation of child custody and it is not possible to eliminate the actual 
suffering and humiliation endured during torture.  In such circum-
stances, the most that can be done is to provide some form of com-
pensation, whether monetary or otherwise, for the effects of the past 
wrong that cannot be eliminated. Compensation attempts to shift 
the harm resulting from the wrong, in that the wrongdoer assumes 
the costs imposed on the victim while providing the victim with re-
sources nominally equivalent to the loss.84 
                                                     
84 Compensation may also be symbolically important following serious 
wrongdoing. The fact that compensation is a concrete payment, with a real cost to 
the wrongdoer equivalent to the benefit for the victim, and not mere words makes 
the demonstration particularly meaningful.  If compensation is monetary, as Kutz 
observes, “the very fungibility of money means that giving it up hurts, for there are 
always alternative uses to which it could be put by its donors.”  Kutz, supra note 26, 
at 279.  Admittedly, in many cases there may be no quantity of money that is a 
meaningful equivalent to the harm suffered as a result of the human rights viola-
tions.  Cf. Restorative Justice and Reparations, supra note 77, at 385 (explaining that the 
goals of restorative justice do not always demand material reparation, especially 
when accepting responsibility and atonement may be more productive); Thomas 
McCarthy, Coming to Terms with Our Past, Part II: On the Morality and Politics of Rep-
arations for Slavery, 32 POL. THEORY 750, 755 (2004) (stating that for “collectively ac-
cumulated, generalized disadvantages” a tort model for individualized damages 
will not be adequate to remedy the harm); Anthony Sebok, Reparations, Unjust En-
richment, and the Importance of Knowing the Difference Between the Two, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. 
SURV. AM. L. 651, 656–57 (2003) (explaining that when reparations for racial or eth-
nic oppression are based on replevin concepts, the moral significance of the repara-
tions remedy is lessened); Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Reparations in the Aftermath of Re-
pression and Mass Violence, in MY NEIGHBOR, MY ENEMY: JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY IN 
THE AFTERMATH OF MASS ATROCITY 121, 122 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein 
eds., 2004) (stating that historically, moral reparations have greater significant to 
victims than material reparations, especially when the harms are intangible); 
CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, REPORT OF THE 
CHILEAN NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION 1057 (University of 
Notre Dame Press ed. & trans., 1993) [hereinafter RETTIG COMMISSION REPORT],   
available at http://www.usip.org/files/resources/collections/truth_commis-
sions/Chile90-Report/Chile90-Report.pdf [perma.cc/ZT6P-XRRM] (posted Feb. 
22, 2002).  See also MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING 
HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE 102-5 (Beacon Press ed.,1998) (advo-
cating emphasis on the symbolic dimension of reparations, given that money is of-
ten insufficient to meet the harm faced).  But even if a monetary payment is incom-
mensurable with the harm suffered, the attempt to compensate may continue to be 
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Such a traditional theory of corrective justice, focused on re-
sponding to concrete material harms—economic loss, physical 
harm, suffering, and the like—may not exhaust the category of gen-
uine reparations, in that there may be genuine reparations that do 
not fit strictly into the analytical categories of traditional corrective 
justice.  Nonetheless, the corrective justice theory illustrates a num-
ber of features that any genuine reparations must have, even accord-
ing to the Inter-American Court.  First, genuine reparations must re-
late present obligations to past violations, in that the past violation 
must be the central factor justifying the present reparatory obliga-
tion.  The Inter-American Court has said: 
 Given that the Court has established that the reparations 
should have a causal nexus with the facts of the case, the vi-
olations declared, the damages proven, and the measures re-
quested to redress the respective damage, it must observe 
that the co-existence of these factors in order to rule appro-
priately and in accordance to the law.85 
Genuine reparations cannot be present- or future-oriented, mak-
ing the past human rights violations irrelevant to the reparatory ob-
ligation.86  This does not necessarily mean that the reparations must 
simply address the material harm from the violation.  A past wrong 
perhaps can require a response—such as recognition of wrongdoing 
or an apology—even when it is impossible to eliminate the material 
harm from the violation.87  The Inter-American Court has accepted 
that it is often impossible to undo a human rights violation, even 
                                                     
an important part of moving forward, as it still shows seriousness of purpose and 
depth of commitment.  
85 Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations 
and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 276, ¶ 139 (Jan. 30, 2014).  Ac-
cord García Lucero v. Chile, Preliminary Objection, Merits and Reparations, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 267, ¶ 212 (Aug. 28, 2013); Suárez Peralta v. 
Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 163; Ticona Estrada v. Bolivia, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R. (ser. C) No. 191, ¶ 110 (Nov. 27, 2008). 
86 To contrast, some people have advanced conceptions of an adequate re-
sponse to wrongdoing that broadly eliminates its backward-looking element.  For 
example, according to Pablo Kalmanovitz, following severe armed conflicts, a state 
ought to prioritize distributive justice, generally ignoring considerations of correc-
tive justice, which he views as largely irrelevant in such circumstances.  See Kalma-
novitz, supra note 26, at 79-91. 
87 See Herman, supra note 83, at 354-55 (explaining that a past wrong is not 
always fixed by a repair or replacement, but through alternative modes of moral 
repair such as an apology). 
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though it is committed to eliminating or compensating for the con-
sequences to the extent possible.88  Nonetheless, the very structural 
and doctrinal commitments of reparations in the Inter-American 
system assume that a past wrong done by the state must be a central 
reason justifying present payments or other remedial actions.89  
Second, genuine reparations ought to justify a present obligation 
to the victim in terms of the past violation.  Reparations are funda-
mentally about repair and the victims are those persons who were 
wrongfully affected by the past human rights violation.  The Inter-
American Court comments: 
The State’s obligation to make reparation arises as a result of 
its responsibility for the facts of the case and the victims af-
fected by these facts. Consequently, the Court cannot order 
the State to make reparation to individuals who, although 
they are victims of other situations, have not been declared 
victims in this specific case.90 
The Inter-American Court narrowly circumscribes the category 
of victims to natural persons who suffered a human rights violation, 
which may include indirect victims.91  So, for example, a theory of 
reparations where there are measures to eliminate the abusive par-
adigms that made possible or were otherwise “at the core of” the 
systematic violations of human rights is not actually a theory of rep-
arations at all.92  Such a view lacks a sufficient connection to what 
the victim suffered and its consequences, and instead simply uses 
                                                     
88 See González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 579, n.547 (iden-
tifying the difficulty in assigning a monetary amount to make up for non-pecuniary 
damage to victims of human rights violations). 
89 Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, supra note 32, at ¶ 26 (explaining that 
reparations in the Inter-American system rest on principles of restitutio in integrum 
which factors in reparation tied to the consequences of the state’s violation). 
90 Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra note 
62, at ¶ 430. 
91 Rule of Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights arts. 2(25), 
(33) (2009) available at https://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/ 
Basic20.Rules%20of%20Procedure%20of%20the%20Court.htm [perma.cc/WM62-
LNBU]; Villalba, supra note 1, at 243, 257.  The Court also allows reparations for 
injured persons not recognized as victims, who are persons affected by the human 
rights violation but who did not suffer a direct violation of their rights.  Id. at 276-
77. 
92 David Gray, No-Excuse Approach to Transitional Justice: Reparations as Tools of 
Extraordinary Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 1043, 1096 (2010) (citing VICTOR TURNER, 
DRAMAS, FIELDS, AND METAPHORS 17 (1974)). 
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the opportunity to order reparations to improve problematic aspects 
of a society, where the victim (and the past violation) are largely ir-
relevant.  Reparations must not only be backward-looking but also 
victim-centered. 
Finally, genuine reparations ought to be non-duplicative, in that 
they should not respond multiple times to the same aspect or conse-
quence of the past human rights violation.  Mexico, in the Cotton 
Field case, complained that the requested reparations were “exces-
sive, repetitive and constitute[d] a request for double reparation, be-
cause many of them refer[red] to the same violations.”93  The com-
plaint seems reasonable in the abstract and the Court seems to 
accept a prohibition on double reparations, saying “reparations 
should not make the victims or their next of kin either richer or 
poorer and they should be directly proportionate to the violations 
that have been declared.”  It went on observe that “[o]ne or more 
measures can repair a specific damage, without this being consid-
ered double reparation.”94  Once reparations constitute a sufficient 
response to the past human rights violation, further reparations are 
illegitimate.  Double reparations render the set of reparations illegit-
imate as a whole because some measures that are part of the set do 
not undo, repair, or compensate for the past human rights violation 
or its consequences.  When there are double reparations, some other 
measure in the total set of reparations already nominally accom-
plishes the goal, so the initial measure lacks an appropriate connec-
tion to the past.  If the Court, for example, were to order complete 
compensation for the effects of a past human rights violation twice, 
the second order would lack an appropriate connection to the past 
human rights violation because the effects would have already been 
addressed. 
2.3. Requirements for Genuine Reparations and the Problem of 
Legitimacy 
Three categories of Inter-American Court orders in contentious 
cases—restitution, compensation, and rehabilitation—can readily 
                                                     
93 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 449; See also Rio Ne-
gro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 45 (depicting Guatemala’s argument 
that duplication of victim names could lead to double reparation); Rosendo Cantú 
v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 205; Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 
222. 
94 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 450.  
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be understood as genuine reparations.  They aim to eliminate (as far 
as possible) the material consequences of the human rights viola-
tion, albeit with an expansive understanding of the material conse-
quences.  In this sense, the Court’s orders are relatively unproblem-
atic, as they can be understood in terms of the traditional backward-
looking corrective justice conception of reparation.95  Restitution 
seeks to literally undo, partially or completely, the past human 
rights violation, such as by restoring to the victim lost property or 
the custody of a child.  Where restitution is impossible, compensa-
tion attempts to eliminate or compensate for the consequences of the 
wrong through monetary means.  Finally, rehabilitation requires 
measures that reduce or eliminate the physical and psychological 
effects of the human rights violation.  All of these measures sit rela-
tively comfortably within the corrective justice commitment to un-
doing or eliminating the harmful consequences of the human rights 
violation as far as possible or to shifting the costs of the violation to 
the wrongdoer.  Even orders to investigate are relatively unprob-
lematic, not because they require genuine reparations but because 
an investigation is plausibly seen as a measure to ensure rights, 
which the Inter-American Convention authorizes the Court to or-
der.96  An order to investigate simply requires the state to cease the 
ongoing human rights violation constituted by a failure to investi-
gate adequately. 
The remaining categories—satisfaction and guarantees of non-
repetition—do not sit so easily with the corrective justice idea of at-
tempting to undo, eliminate, or compensate for the consequences of 
a past wrong.  Orders to provide satisfaction, such as apologies, ad-
missions of responsibility, and the like, are occasioned by and re-
spond to the past human rights violation itself, but relate to the 
wrong done, not the consequences of the wrong.  For example, the 
Court often requires that the state publish the judgment, hold a pub-
lic event accepting responsibility, and construct monuments to the 
victims,97 none of which necessarily have anything to do with 
whether the human rights violation had further consequences or 
                                                     
95 Specifically, they can be understood as the result of a classical corrective jus-
tice principle.  See supra notes 76-81 and accompanying text. 
96 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
97 See, e.g., Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 263, 
265 (detailing the reparations ordered by the Inter-American Court to the Domini-
can Republic for the state’s excessive use of force against a group of Haitians); Río 
Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 274, 277, 280. 
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even caused harm.  Guarantees of non-repetition in most cases seem 
to have little to do with the past human rights violation or its conse-
quences,98 as they are designed to prevent future violations of a sim-
ilar sort, and not always for the direct victim.  For example, the state 
is frequently required to change laws, provide training, or establish 
educational programs, all of which tend to prevent future human 
rights violations.99  When the victim would not otherwise be ex-
pected to suffer a repetition of the same sort of violation, it is unclear 
why these measures are directed at the victim. 
Still more troubling is the fact that these extraordinary measures 
may seem to be redundant or duplicative, constituting double repa-
rations.  These measures pose an important puzzle because the In-
ter-American Court frequently grants compensation and rehabilita-
tion theoretically sufficient to undo or eliminate the consequences of 
the human rights violation prior to assigning additional measures of 
satisfaction or guarantees of non-repetition.  The Court has stated, 
“this non-pecuniary damage may include both the suffering and dis-
tress caused to the direct victims and their next of kin, and the im-
pairment of values that are highly significant to them, as well as 
other sufferings that cannot be assessed in financial terms.”100  When 
compensation has already been ordered for non-pecuniary damage 
as well as the economically-assessable pecuniary damage,101 it is not 
obvious why there would be additional features of the past human 
rights violations sufficient to justify further genuine reparations.102  
                                                     
98 Cf. Dinah Shelton, Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Respon-
sibility, 96 AM. J. INT’L L. 833, 844 (2002) (explaining the many theories of reparations 
that can be employed). 
99 See, e.g., Nadege Dorzema v. Dominican Republic, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 269-
70, 272, 275 (identifying reparations that apparently do not affect the victim but 
instead serve to prevent future human rights violations); Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra 
note 12, at ¶¶ 271-72, 284; González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 
502, 541, 543. 
100 “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales) v. Guatemala, supra note 67, at ¶ 103.  
See also, e.g., Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, supra note 85, at ¶ 156 (stating an equiv-
alent view of non-pecuniary damages’ relation to the suffering and distress of direct 
victims and next of kin); J. v. Peru, supra note 40, at ¶ 415. 
101 See, e.g., Liakat Ali Alibux v. Suriname, supra note 85, at ¶ 153; J. v. Peru , 
supra note 40, at ¶ 415; “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales) v. Guatemala, supra 
note 67, at ¶¶ 78-80. 
102 This problem is accentuated by the fact that the Court frequently claims that 
guarantees of non-repetition or measures of satisfaction respond to non-pecuniary 
effects of the human rights violation.  Afro-descendant Communities (Operation 
Genesis) v. Colombia, supra note 62, at ¶ 441; Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, 
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For the extraordinary reparative measures ordered as satisfaction or 
guarantees of non-repetition to be genuine and the orders legiti-
mate, they must respond to some aspect of how the past human 
rights violation affected the victims that was not addressed by other 
measures of restitution, compensation, or rehabilitation. 
3.  CESSATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS 
While guarantees of non-repetition may appear somewhat mys-
terious as a category of reparations—seemingly neither backwards-
looking nor victim-centric—many or most of these measures may be 
understood as legitimate orders to cease ongoing human rights vio-
lations.  Such an order would be equivalent to a domestic court in-
validating an unconstitutional law or practice in a concrete case 
where the law or practice was applied and generated a constitu-
tional violation.  Perhaps echoing this interpretation, the Inter-
American Court has said, “when exercising its contentious jurisdic-
tion, the Court may order States, among other satisfaction and non-
repetition measures, to adapt their domestic law to conform to the 
American Convention, therefore as to amend or remove any provi-
sions that unjustifiably curtail such rights.”103  Whether or not we 
understand such measures in a strict sense as reparations, or simply 
a related remedy for human rights violations, orders to stop an on-
going violation are often legitimate because the Inter-American 
Court must “rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of 
his right or freedom that was violated.”104  This section will explain 
why orders to provide guarantees of non-repetition may not appear 
legitimate, argue that they may be understood as legitimate orders 
to cease ongoing human rights violations, and suggest that they are 
legitimate only if the ongoing violation is connected to a concrete 
human rights violation. 
3.1. Legitimacy, Reparations, and Guarantees of Non-Repetition 
The problem for the legitimacy of guarantees of non-repetition 
is that they are apparently neither backwards-looking, justified in 
                                                     
supra note 62, at ¶ 264; Goiburú v. Paraguay, supra note 62, at ¶ 163. 
103 Tristán Donoso v. Panama, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 193 ¶ 176 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
104 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
 
2016] EXTRAORDINARY REPARATIONS 841 
 
terms of the past human rights violation, nor victim-centered, bene-
fiting the victim in some sense.  Guarantees of non-repetition in the 
jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court have included orders to 
change laws or public policy,105 to provide human rights training for 
officials,106 and to reform prison conditions.107  These measures are 
not obviously backwards-looking because they seemingly aim to 
prevent future recurrences of the same sort of human rights viola-
tions that occurred in the past.  The Court’s decisions require states 
to “adopt all the necessary . . . measures to make the exercise of these 
rights effective . . .”108 as guarantees of non-repetition.  For example, 
human rights training for the military or police seeks to ensure that 
they respect human rights in the execution of their duties and func-
tions in the future.109  They are also not obviously aimed at the victim 
because the victim will often not be expected to benefit from the 
measures, so they do not really ensure the rights or freedoms of the 
victim in particular.  The reason is simple: in many, but not all, cases, 
there is no reason to think the particular victim is likely to be a victim 
of a future human rights violation of the same sort.  For example, it 
may not be very likely that the survivor of a massacre will be subject 
to another massacre.110  
Of course, in some cases it is likely that an individual will be 
subject to the same human rights violation again in the future, such 
as a prisoner who experienced abuse at the hands of guards or fel-
low prisoners111 or an indigenous community whose traditional 
                                                     
105 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 271; Mendoza v. Argentina, supra 
note 33, at ¶ 332; Pacheco Teruel v. Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 100. 
106 Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42 at ¶ 308; Barrios Family v. Venezuela, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 341; Gomes Lund (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, supra note 
47, at ¶ 283. 
107 Díaz-Peña v. Venezuela, supra note 58, at ¶ 154; Pacheco Teruel v. Hondu-
ras, supra note 4, at ¶ 96. 
108 Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 165.  See also Luna López v. Hon-
duras, supra note 3, at ¶ 234 (explaining that these measures to guarantee non-rep-
etition can be legal, administrative, or distinct from these two approaches); Suárez 
Peralta v. Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 195; Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertilization) v. 
Costa Rica, supra note 42, at ¶ 334; Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 323; 
Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42, at ¶ 300.  
109 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 274; Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra 
note 2, at ¶ 168. 
110 See Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 62 (detailing the Pueblo 
Bello Massacre and its victims).  
111 Cf. Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 103 (demonstrating that cer-
tain victims of human rights abuses, like prisoners, are susceptible to similar future 
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lands have not been adequately delimited and titled, generating re-
peated violations of their right to use the land.112  In such cases, it 
might be possible to argue that guarantees of non-repetition consti-
tute genuine reparations because they are focused on the particular 
victim and because the likely future violations have direct connec-
tions to the past violation.  The connection might be that they are the 
manifestation of an ongoing pattern of violations against the victim 
or that the series of violations against the victim share a common 
immediate cause.  But, whether or not such an approach is success-
ful in explaining why such guarantees of non-repetition are genuine 
reparations and why the orders to provide them are legitimate in the 
case of repeating human rights violations, they cannot explain why 
Inter-American Court orders to provide guarantees of non-repeti-
tion are legitimate in general.  In far too many cases, the Court or-
ders guarantees of non-repetition even when the identified victims 
are unlikely to benefit from the required measures. 
3.2. Guarantees of Non-Repetition as Cessation Orders 
Instead, the Court’s orders to provide guarantees of non-repeti-
tion are often legitimate because they simply require the cessation 
of ongoing human rights violations.  The specific guarantees of non-
repetition ordered typically correspond to ongoing violations of 
state human rights obligations.  In fact, the Inter-American Court 
has connected guarantees of non-repetition to articles 1(1) and 2 of 
the American Convention, which establish a state obligation to guar-
antee human rights, including by adopting legislative and other nec-
essary measures.113  According to the Court, “the State must prevent 
the reoccurrence of the human rights violations . . . and adopt all 
legal, administrative and other measures necessary to protect . . . the 
exercise of . . . human rights, in compliance with the obligations to 
respect and guarantee rights enshrined in Article 1(1) and 2 of the 
Convention.”114  Even if cessation based on the obligation to guar-
antee human rights may not theoretically be a form of reparation, 
                                                     
violations).  
112 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 79, ¶ 153 (Aug. 31, 2001). 
113 Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 1(1), 2. 
114 Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 234.  See also Gutiérrez v. Ar-
gentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 165 (employing similar operative language to demon-
strate the importance of preventing the reoccurrence of human rights violation); 
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ordering cessation undoubtedly is a legitimate power of the Inter-
American Court.115  Article 63(1) of the American Convention re-
quires the Court to order the state to ensure the enjoyment of the 
violated rights, which entails orders to cease ongoing violations.  As 
the Court has explained, “[w]hen an unlawful act occurs, . . . this 
gives rise immediately to its international responsibility, with the 
consequent obligation to cause the consequences of the violation to 
cease . . . .” 116 
Although such cessation orders are often legitimate, they are not 
orders to provide reparations.  Cessation orders are not orders to 
respond to a past violation but orders to stop ongoing violations.  
They are not reparations because a cessation order does not reflect a 
state legal obligation that is independent from its primary human 
rights obligations, including taking measures to protect and guaran-
tee human rights.  A cessation order simply requires the state to 
comply with its primary human rights obligations that exist inde-
pendently of any specific past violation.  In contrast, reparations re-
flect a secondary obligation of the state to respond to the aftermath 
of a concrete human rights violation, removing, if possible, all ves-
tiges of the violation, and compensating for those consequences that 
                                                     
Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 195; Artavia Murillo (in vitro fertili-
zation) v. Costa Rica, supra note 42, at ¶ 334.  
115 The precise problem that guarantees of non-repetition commonly have in 
the context of the Inter-American Court jurisprudence is that circumstances often 
do not seem to require assurances or guarantees of non-repetition.  In those circum-
stances where there is genuinely a risk of repetition, the analysis in Part IV may 
provide a supplementary basis for state obligations. 
116 Yatama v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R. (ser. C) No. 127, ¶ 231 (June 23, 2005); See also 
Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, supra note 63, at ¶ 62 (explaining how this responsi-
bility arises from a principle of customary international law); Acosta Calderón v. 
Ecuador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R. (ser. C) No. 
129, ¶ 146 (June 24, 2005); Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct, H.R. (ser. C) No. 123, ¶ 121 (Mar. 11, 2005); Serrano 
Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, supra note 63, at ¶ 134.  In effect, the American Conven-
tion lets the Inter-American Court enforce a more general obligation of interna-
tional law, requiring states to cease commission of wrongful acts or omissions that 
generate international responsibility.  See Draft Articles of State Responsibility art. 
30 (“The State responsible for the internationally wrongful act is under an obliga-
tion: . . . (a) to cease that act, if it is continuing; . . . (b) to offer appropriate assurances 
and guarantees of non-repetition, if circumstances so require.”) available at http:// 
legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf 
[perma.cc/FDD7-BDTZ]. 
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cannot be eliminated.  Reparations seek to correct for the conse-
quences of a violation, while cessation simply seeks to stop the vio-
lation itself.  Thus, orders to guarantee human rights are often legit-
imate because they require the cessation of a human rights violation, 
not because they require the state to provide reparations. 
The measures the Inter-American Court orders as guarantees of 
non-repetition are exactly the sort of measures that the American 
Convention independently requires to fulfill the state obligation to 
guarantee human rights.  The state must proactively ensure that 
public officials have sufficient human rights training so as to respect 
human rights, it must implement laws when required to guarantee 
human rights, and it must eliminate laws that fail to respect human 
rights.117  For example, the Inter-American Court has ordered on 
various occasions the elimination of laws granting amnesty for seri-
ous human rights abuses, which interfere with the state obligation 
to investigate, prosecute, and punish.118  When prison conditions are 
incompatible with the human rights of an individual, the state must 
change those conditions.119  In this sense, the major guarantees of 
non-repetition that the Court orders simply eliminate ongoing vio-
lations of the state’s human rights obligations.  Similarly, although 
the Court does not generally categorize them as a guarantee of non-
repetition, it frequently gives states orders to investigate, prosecute, 
and punish those responsible for certain human rights violations.  
Like guarantees of non-repetition, these are cessation orders: in the 
absence of an adequate investigation, the state commits an ongoing 
human rights violation against the victim.  The state has a primary 
human rights obligation to investigate, prosecute, and punish seri-
ous human rights violations.120  The Court’s order to investigate, 
                                                     
117 Mendoza v. Argentina, supra note 33, at ¶ 332; Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra 
note 2, at 165-71.  
118 Gomes Lund (“Guerrilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, supra note 47, at ¶ 30; 
Almonacid-Arellano v. Chile, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 154, ¶¶ 114, 119, 122 (Sept. 26, 
2006); La Cantuta v. Peru, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 162, ¶ 152 (Nov. 29, 2006) (in dicta); Barrios Altos v. Peru, Repara-
tions, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 83, ¶ 18 (Sept. 3, 2001); Id. at ¶ 41. 
119 Díaz-Peña v. Venezuela, supra note 58, at ¶ 154; Pacheco Teruel v. Hondu-
ras, supra note 4, at ¶ 96. 
120 Massacres of El Mozote v. El Salvador, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 242 (Oct. 25, 2012); Gomes Lund (“Guer-
rilha do Araguaia”) v. Brazil, supra note 47, at ¶ 137; Velásquez Rodríguez v. Hon-
duras, supra note 32, at ¶ 166. 
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prosecute, and punish is simply an order to cease committing the 
ongoing violation via omitting to fulfill this obligation. 
This sort of explanation makes sense of some otherwise puzzling 
connections the Court draws between guarantees of non-repetition 
and violations of the American Convention.  On several occasions, 
the Court has declined to order guarantees of non-repetition consist-
ing of changes to domestic law partly on the grounds that it had not 
considered whether domestic law was compatible with interna-
tional law.  For this reason, the Court has decided not “to order the 
adoption, amendment or adaptation of specific provisions of domes-
tic law,”121 such as “creation of investigation protocols,”122 changes 
to refugee and immigration law,123 legal reforms to eliminate dis-
criminatory practices,124 or adjustments to laws on the selection of 
judges.125  It has decided not to order human rights training on the 
same grounds, when it was unproven that a general problem of con-
duct contrary to the American Convention existed.126  The repeated 
reference to the American Convention as the standard to determine 
whether a particular guarantee of non-repetition should be ordered 
is significant.  If a guarantee of non-repetition were simply any 
measure that would be effective to prevent future human rights vi-
olations, it is irrelevant whether the current law or practice was com-
patible with the American Convention.  The potential effectiveness 
of a change to the law or practice would be sufficient.  But if guar-
antees of non-repetition are really designed to eliminate conditions 
that are contrary to state obligations under the American Conven-
tion, the relevance is obvious and immediate. 
3.3. Cessation Orders and Causation 
 If guarantees of non-repetition are simply cessation orders for 
violations of the obligation to guarantee human rights, is the Inter-
American Court legally empowered to issue any order requiring 
                                                     
121 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, supra note 45, at ¶ 
276.  See generally Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 238; Atala Riffo v. 
Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 280; Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 222, ¶ 131 (Mar. 3, 2011). 
122 Luna López v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 238.  
123 Pacheco Tineo Family v. Bolivia, supra note 41, at ¶ 266. 
124 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 280.  
125 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, supra note 45, at ¶ 
276. 
126 Salvador-Chiriboga v. Ecuador, supra note 121, at ¶ 131.  
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2016
  
846 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 37:3 
 
compliance with that obligation?  One account suggests that it may.  
Judith Schonsteiner correctly concludes that many of the measures 
the Court orders as guarantees of non-repetition are also measures 
that the obligation to guarantee human rights plausibly requires of 
states.127  However, her account emphasizes the state’s obligation to 
guarantee human rights without explaining why the Inter-American 
Court is authorized to order measures that fulfill the obligation. 128  
The Court is not authorized to order the state to take just any meas-
ure that one of its human rights obligations requires; article 63(1) of 
the American Convention does not grant such a general power but 
instead ties the power to past identified human rights violations.129  
Consequently, Schonsteiner’s account does not fully explain the 
connection between article 63 and cessation of article 1(1) and 2 vio-
lations, which the Inter-American Court emphasizes as both the 
source of and a limitation on its power to order cessation of human 
rights violations.130 
 It is more plausible that the Inter-American Court may not order 
just any measure required by the substantive state obligation to 
guarantee human rights.  Despite the fact that orders to provide 
guarantees of non-repetition are justified as cessation orders and not 
as reparation orders, the Court typically limits its orders to measures 
that are closely connected to the human rights violations at issue in 
a given case.131  One reason has to do with the text of the American 
                                                     
127 Judith Schonsteiner, Dissuasive Measures and the "Society as a Whole": A Work-
ing Theory of Reparations in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 23 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 127, 145-47 (2011). 
128 Id. at 145-46. 
129 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
130 Luna López,v. Honduras, supra note 3, at ¶ 234.  See also Gutiérrez v. Ar-
gentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 165 (holding that “in the exercise of its powers concerning 
the international judicial protection of human rights, a matter that goes beyond the 
will of the parties, it is incumbent on the Court to ensure that acts of acquiescence 
are acceptable for the objectives that the inter-American system for the protection 
of human rights seeks to achieve.”); Suárez Peralta v. Ecuador, supra note 41, at ¶ 
195 (detailing the state’s obligations to do all “legal administrative, and other 
measures that are necessary to ensure that the exercise of the rights is effective”); 
Artavia Murillo (“in vitro fertilization”) v. Costa Rica, supra note 43, at ¶ 334 
(“[b]ased on the provisions of Article 63(1)…. The Court has indicated that every 
violation on an international obligation that causes damage entails the obligation 
to provide adequate reparation”). 
131 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, supra note 45, at ¶ 
276; Gudiel Álvarez ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala, supra note 38, at ¶ 353; Atala 
Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 280; Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42, at  ¶ 301.  
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Convention, which requires that “the injured party be ensured the 
enjoyment of his right or freedom that was violated.”132  The princi-
pal apparent limitation from this cessation clause is that a permissi-
ble cessation order must require a measure necessary to ensure 
against the actual past human rights violation that the victim suf-
fered.133  A second reason, necessary to understand the Court’s sur-
prisingly restrictive interpretation of the cessation clause, has to do 
with the limited institutional competencies of the Inter-American 
Court in the system. 
The text of the cessation clause itself does not seem to require 
more than a weak connection between the past violation and the 
measures that the Court orders.  In fact, on a narrow, purely textual 
reading, it does not even seem to require that the ordered measure 
be aimed at avoiding future violations of the same sort so long as it 
is aimed at avoiding future violations of the same right.  But the lim-
itation makes sense only if it limits cessation orders to those con-
cerning future violations of the same sort, because the same right may 
be violated in ways that have nothing to do with the events under 
consideration in a given case.  Even taking this point into account, 
the limitation could be quite weak.  It could simply require that the 
Court had found that the state violated its obligation to guarantee 
the victim’s right, and take that to be sufficient for cessation orders, 
whether or not connected to any further injury.  More stringently, it 
could require that the measures ordered, even when otherwise re-
quired by the American Convention, had some bearing on the iden-
tified, concrete human rights violations, such as by making them 
more likely.  On this interpretation, for example, it would be permis-
sible to order human rights training for state officials only if the lack 
of human rights training had some bearing on the commission of a 
                                                     
132 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1). 
133 The argument here is neutral between three different interpretations of the 
apparent injury requirement.  First, the injury requirement might constitute a 
standing requirement, meaning that the Court has the power to order cessation of 
an act or omission only when it has caused a concrete injury to the victim.  That is, 
a person may be able to suffer actual human rights violations at the hands of general 
laws, practices, or policies, or their omissions for which the Court cannot order ces-
sation.  Second, the injury requirement might amount to a substantive claim that a 
person has not suffered a human rights violation at all until the state failure to en-
sure actually results in an infringement of the “the free and full exercise of those 
rights and freedoms.”  American Convention on Human Rights art. 1(1), Nov. 22, 
1969.  Third, the injury requirement may be purely procedural in that the Court 
may only order the cessation of a law, practice, or policy, or its omission when it 
has identified that it constitutes a violation of state obligations. 
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concrete human rights violation.  Both of these expansive interpre-
tations of the cessation clause seem compatible with the text and 
purpose of the American Convention. 
Nonetheless, the Inter-American Court has implicitly inter-
preted this requirement in a more stringent way, requiring a causal 
connection between the general violation of the state’s obligation to 
guarantee human rights and the concrete injury that the victim suf-
fered.  On a number of occasions, the Court has indicated that it will 
order as guarantees of non-repetition the cessation of a law, practice, 
or policy, or its omission only when it is proven that there was a 
causal connection between the law, practice, or policy (or omission 
thereof) and the concrete human rights violation.134  It did so in cases 
of laws “access to health care, rehabilitation and social security ser-
vices,”135 potentially discriminatory laws,136 and procedures for se-
lecting judges.137  In effect, this condition requires that the state vio-
late its general obligation to guarantee human rights and that the 
violation contributed causally to a more concrete violation, such as 
an actual denial of health care or an act of discrimination.  It would 
also require, of course, that a law, practice, or state of affairs contrary 
to state human rights obligations continues to exist so that the Court 
may order its cessation.138 
Although there may be alternatives to the Inter-American 
Court’s narrow interpretation of the cessation clause, it is reasonable 
given the Court’s status as a secondary mechanism for upholding 
                                                     
134 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, supra note 45 at ¶ 276; 
Gudiel Álvarez ("Diario Militar") v. Guatemala, supra note 38, at ¶ 353; Atala Riffo 
v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 280; Furlan v. Argentina, supra note 42, at ¶ 301.  
135 Vélez Restrepo v. Colombia, supra note 39, at ¶ 301.  
136 Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra note 12, at ¶ 280.  
137 Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, supra note 45, at ¶ 
276.  
138 Many guarantees of non-repetition cannot be fully justified as cessation or-
ders, because they require changes to laws or practices that the Court did not find 
on the merits to constitute human rights violations.  Care is required here, as there 
are extensive positive human rights obligations, such as the creation of laws to 
make human rights effective, and so many guarantees are potentially justifiable as 
cessation orders even if the Court fails to provide adequate justification in the actual 
decision.  Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1).  See also Supreme Court of Justice 
(Quintana Coello) v. Ecuador, Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 266, ¶ 221 (Aug. 23, 2013) (expand-
ing a state’s positive obligations to enact laws to further respect for human rights 
to include the obligation to avoid passing legislation that would conflict with this 
positive obligation).  
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
 
2016] EXTRAORDINARY REPARATIONS 849 
 
human rights.  States are assigned the primary responsibility for 
guaranteeing that individuals may fully exercise and enjoy their hu-
man rights, with the Inter-American system acting as a secondary 
mechanism to ensure that states fulfill that responsibility.139  Initial 
decisions on how best to guarantee the human rights of individuals 
through law and public policy are often best left to the states.  States, 
possibly subject to democratic accountability, may be better posi-
tioned to weigh costs and benefits of different policies, including the 
monetary and other resources required, opportunity costs, potential 
effectiveness of different uses of those resources, and tradeoffs be-
tween different rights, among many others factors.140  At the same 
time, the Inter-American Court does have the responsibility of en-
suring that the state fulfills its obligation to guarantee human rights.  
When a concrete human rights violation arises as a result of a failure 
of law or policy, the Court is better positioned to evaluate whether 
the decisions the state has made to guarantee rights are adequate.  
The competing considerations will be more fully fleshed out, the 
ways in which the law or policy functions in practice will be clearer, 
and more of the relevant information will be available.  When the 
Court orders changes to comply with the obligation to guarantee 
human rights, it is acting in this more limited context, more appro-
priate for judicial decision-making.  
3.4. The Scope and Limits of Guarantees of Non-Repetition 
If orders to provide guarantees of non-repetition are legitimate 
because they require the cessation of failures to guarantee human 
rights that causally contributed to violations, then the Inter-Ameri-
can Court could be more aggressive with these measures.  Many, if 
not most, concrete human rights abuses are the product of system-
                                                     
139 See Convention, supra note 11, at arts. 1, 2, 46 (clarifying that domestic rem-
edies are to be exhausted first); See also David L. Attanasio, Militarized Criminal Or-
ganizations, supra note 15, at 376  (explaining the secondary role of the Inter-Ameri-
can system).  
140 David L. Attanasio, Militarized Criminal Organizations, supra note 15, at 389.  
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atic social problems, such as discrimination or social marginaliza-
tion of certain persons,141 ideologies that support human rights vio-
lations,142 or lack of state presence and capacity.143  The Inter-Amer-
ican Court could find that the failure of state action to ameliorate 
these systematic problems constitutes a general failure to protect or 
guarantee human rights because these problems can be expected to 
generate, more or less directly, many concrete human rights viola-
tions.144  For example, popular values, customs, and beliefs that treat 
women as less socially valuable and subordinate to men might be 
expected not only to generate extreme crimes like the murders in 
Cotton Field but also more frequent wrongful acts of domestic vio-
lence and official indifference.  The state, as guarantor of human 
rights, could combat such systematic problems through, for exam-
ple, programs that change public attitudes, such as changes to public 
school curricula, broadcasting television programs or commercials, 
or mandatory training for workers.  It could also do so through law, 
public policy, and institutions that target the effects of violations, 
such as prohibitions on official or private discrimination. 
However, ordering such guarantees of non-repetition is legally 
legitimate only if they actually require the cessation of ongoing hu-
man rights violations, which in turn depends on the ongoing viola-
tion being proven.  It is not sufficient for the Court to simply mention 
a connection between a proposed guarantee of non-repetition and 
the past concrete violation; the Court must identify proven state ac-
tions or omissions that are incompatible with the American Conven-
tion.  If the ongoing violation of the state obligation to protect or 
guarantee is not legally proven, it cannot be the basis for a legal or-
der, due to fundamental considerations of due process that demand 
an explicit and motivated decision.  Such formalities ensure that the 
                                                     
141 See, e.g., “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales) v. Guatemala, supra note 67, 
at ¶¶ 139, 191  (discussing reparations for human rights violations against children 
in Guatemala).  
142 See, e.g., David Pion-Berlin, National Security Doctrine, Military Threat Percep-
tion, and the “Dirty War” in Argentina, 21 COMP. POL. STUD. 382 (1988) (discussing the 
political ideologies in Argentina that fuel human rights violations).  
143 See, e.g., MAURICIO GARCÍA VILLEGAS & JOSE RAFAEL ESPINOSA R., EL DERECHO 
AL ESTADO: LOS EFECTOS LEGALES DEL APARTHEID INSTITUCIONAL EN COLOMBIA 40-121 
(2014) (discussing the lack of state control and its contribution to human rights vi-
olations in Colombia). 
144 See, e.g., “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales), supra note 67, at ¶ 144 (hol-
ding that the failures of the government and police force amounted to the harms 
citizens faced).  
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Court fully considers its decisions and guards against carelessness, 
overreach, or abuse, which is particularly important in light of the 
sensitive nature of the orders and their potential expansiveness.  
Perhaps incorporating these values, article 63 of the American Con-
vention only grants the power to order cessation of violations that 
the Court has found.145  These considerations are relevant not only 
to the actual legal legitimacy of the orders but also to perceived le-
gitimacy and likely state compliance: if the underlying violation is 
identified and legally justified, a state will have a harder time dis-
missing the orders as unwarranted judicial meddling. 
4.  REPAIR OF SOCIAL BONDS BETWEEN STATE AND VICTIM 
Although many measures of satisfaction appear to constitute 
genuine reparations—for example, state apologies or recognition of 
responsibility—it is not clear why they constitute reparations.  They 
do not seem to be applications of traditional corrective justice be-
cause they do not seek to eliminate, repair, or compensate for the 
material effects of the past wrong.  Instead, in the Inter-American 
Court’s words, they are “public acts or works that seek, inter alia, to 
commemorate and dignify victims . . . .”146  This problem may seem 
largely theoretical.  Nonetheless, understanding why measures of 
satisfaction are reparations will clarify whether some of the more 
exotic measures of satisfaction, such as education, community infra-
structure, or housing,147 constitute genuine reparations.  In short, it 
will allow us to determine whether Inter-American Court orders to 
provide such reparations are legitimate and are within the Court’s 
legal powers.  This section will propose that material harm to vic-
tims is not the only consequence of a human rights violation that 
supports genuine reparations, but that other dimensions of its ef-
fects may also require reparations.  Specifically, it will argue that 
                                                     
145 Convention, supra note 11, at art. 63(1).  
146 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 63, at ¶ 191.  See also Serrano 
Cruz Sisters v. El Salvador, supra note 63, at ¶ 156 (seeking to address the human 
rights violations to dignify the victims); Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 
supra note 63, at ¶ 80 (stating “[t]he survivors of the Plan de Sanchez massacre can 
now fully reconstruct or reconstitute their relations with their dead, vindicated by 
this judgment”). 
147 Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 284; Osorio Rivera v. 
Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 267; Barrios Family v. Venezuela, supra note 5, at ¶ 226; 
Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 145-48; García Cruz and Sánchez Sil-
vestre v. Mexico, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 80, 83.  
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harm to trust—resulting from the disrespect for the victim demon-
strated through a human rights violation—can justify a form of gen-
uine reparations.  
4.1. Trust, Respect, and Social Repair 
There is substantial divergence of opinion regarding the theoret-
ical foundations for measures of satisfaction.  Nonetheless, Dinah 
Shelton helpfully suggests at least two distinct functions that 
measures of satisfaction may play in a human rights context.  First, 
she proposes that we can understand measures of satisfaction as 
outgrowths of the right to truth about past human rights violation.148  
This idea fits well with certain reparations that the Inter-American 
Court has ordered as measures of satisfaction, such as “a full and 
public disclosure of the truth; the identification of a deceased or dis-
appeared person’s remains; . . . as well as the issuance of official 
statements accepting responsibility and apologizing.”149  But it does 
not fit as well with a number of other measures the Court has re-
quired, such as the construction of monuments or museums, the 
provision of academic scholarships, and the construction of commu-
nity education centers.150  Second, Shelton also proposes that 
measures of satisfaction may respond to dignitary harm.151  How-
ever, she does not provide much explanation as to the nature of dig-
nitary harm, what sort of measures might repair it, how they might 
repair it, and whether the measures would vary depending on the 
human rights violation at issue. 
One way to understand reparations for dignitary harms is in 
terms of reparations that seek to repair victim trust in the state 
harmed by the disrespect shown though a past human rights viola-
tion,152 requiring, in the terms of the Inter-American Court, efforts 
                                                     
148 DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 276 (2d 
ed., 2005). 
149 Id. at 277. 
150 See generally supra notes 61-75 and surrounding text (demonstrating the 
range of remedies the Court has imposed based on the context of the human rights 
violation).  
151 SHELTON, supra note 148, at 277.  
152 The theory proposed here draws from one school of philosophical thought 
on reparations and reconciliation. JANNA THOMPSON, TAKING RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE 
PAST: REPARATION AND HISTORICAL INJUSTICE 50 (2002); Restorative Justice and Repara-
tions, supra note 77, at 384; MORAL REPAIR, supra note 26, at 23, 209-10.  Linda Radzik 
and Colleen Murphy have also recently published excellent books relevant to this 
issue.  See generally LINDA RADZIK, MAKING AMENDS: ATONEMENT IN MORALITY, LAW, 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
 
2016] EXTRAORDINARY REPARATIONS 853 
 
to recognize and dignify the victims as well as to commemorate 
what they suffered.153  Trust is a belief or attitude toward another 
that involves a certain degree of optimism about his or her future 
behavior.154  The optimism must involve a belief that the other has 
the right motives and is committed to acting well, as well as limited 
suspicion as to whether those motives and commitments exist.155  
While writers differ on the appropriate motives, these might include 
a commitment to obeying appropriate moral or legal norms, sharing 
the interests of the trusting person, or having good will towards him 
or her.156  Suffering a serious human rights violation at the hands of 
one’s state will create significant and appropriate doubt or disbelief 
that the state has the right motives and is committed to acting well.  
Repairing victim trust would then require measures that appropri-
ately demonstrate that the state genuinely cares about the victim 
and what he or she suffered.157  Consider a case where state agents 
torture a person. In such a situation, the state demonstrates an in-
sufficient degree of respect for the victim because it deviates from 
the standard of conduct that the state owes the victim.  Such a 
demonstration interferes with the victim’s appropriate optimism 
that the state is motivated and committed to treating him or her ac-
cording to that standard.158  To overcome such a barrier, the state (or 
                                                     
AND POLITICS (2009); COLLEEN MURPHY, A MORAL THEORY OF POLITICAL 
RECONCILIATION (2010). 
153 See supra note 148, and surrounding text. 
154 See Annette C. Baier, Trust, in 11 TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUE 107, 
111 (1991) (describing the feeling of trust as an “impression of reflexion”); Karen 
Jones, Trust as an Affective Attitude, 107 ETHICS 4, 6 (1996); Lawrence C. Becker, Trust 
as Noncognitive Security about Motives, 107 ETHICS 43, 44-45, 53 (1996); Trudy Govier, 
Self-Trust, Autonomy, and Self-Esteem, 8 HYPATIA 99, 104 (1993) (all explaining how 
trust is critical for humans and how it is processed by humans). 
155 This optimism cannot arise from careful monitoring, protection against 
misbehavior, and control of person, as pursuing those forms of assurance suggests 
distrust, not trust.  See Baier, supra note 154, at 111-13; Govier, supra note 154, at 104-
05 (explaining that trust is a reflexive feeling, rather than one produced by a careful 
survey of one’s circumstances).  For a noncognitivist equivalent, see generally 
Becker, supra note 154. 
156 See Baier, supra note 154, at 111-12; Govier supra note 154, at 104; Jones, supra 
note 154, at 6 (all explaining generally the phenomenon of trust).  
157 This idea is possibly just another application of the corrective justice prin-
ciple, requiring that the wrongdoer undo, eliminate the effects of, or compensate 
for the past wrong and its harm.  The difference from an orthodox corrective justice 
is that the harm is understood very broadly, to include harm to the important rela-
tionship between the state and the victim. 
158 For human rights violations, the demonstrated degree of deviation from 
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society) must make it reasonable for the victim to believe that the 
state cares about the victim to an adequate degree that the state will 
not deviate from the acceptable standard of treatment. 
Eliminating such appropriate barriers to victim trust in the state 
is important for a number of reasons.  Such trust is essential for the 
victim to participate once again in the social and political commu-
nity as an equal member.159  Without reasonable trust in the state, 
the victim cannot reasonably expect that his or her participation will 
be taken seriously, or that it would even be safe to assert herself as 
part of the community.160  But even from the perspective of the state, 
restoring victim trust is important in achieving social stability and 
legitimacy.161  If the victims do not redevelop trust, they will have 
reason to take those measures within their power to control, moni-
tor, and protect themselves against the state.  The motivation to take 
such measures is intrinsically destabilizing because it places indi-
viduals in opposition to the state.  Even when victims cannot take 
effective measures to monitor and protect themselves, the reasona-
ble motivation to do so speaks to the legitimacy of the state in their 
eyes.  A state that can reasonably be seen as a potential predator 
lacks an important aspect of legitimacy in front of these citizens. 
Reparative measures must be sufficient to remove appropriate 
barriers to the victim’s trust arising from the human rights violation.  
                                                     
appropriate level of caring is closely connected to the harm suffered. According to 
Linda Radzik, wrongdoing both expresses a message that the victim does not re-
quire better treatment and subjects the victim to harm incompatible with the treat-
ment he or she deserves.  See RADZIK, supra note 155, at 76 (differentiating harm 
caused by wrongdoing from other injuries). 
159 See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 501 (1989) (alt-
hough discussing quite a different problem, suggesting a notion of a morally ap-
propriate relationship that makes sense as the goal of social repair following serious 
human rights violations by stating, “[a]n integrated citizen accepts that the value of 
his own life depends on the success of his community in treating everyone with 
equal concern”).  
160 See RADZIK, supra note 152, at 77 (describing a victim’s fear by stating that 
“[t]he wrongful act functions as a kind of testimony that this sort of treatment is 
acceptable. . . . The severity of the wrong committed . . . generally correlates with 
the severity of the future harms that the victim may reasonably fear”). 
161 See Dworkin, supra note 159, at 501-02 (“An integrated citizen accepts that 
the value of his own life depends on the success of his community in treating eve-
ryone with equal concern. Suppose this sense is public and transparent: everyone 
understands that everyone else shares that attitude. Then the community will have 
an important source of stability and legitimacy even though its members disagree 
greatly about what justice is.”). 
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The reparative measures must be sufficient enough so that the vic-
tim trusts that the state will treat him or her according to appropriate 
standards necessary for equal participation in the community.162  In 
this sense, an individual’s trust in his state can be understood as the 
expectation that the society or state will treat him or her with equal 
consideration.  From this perspective, non-pecuniary or non-mate-
rial damage—which the Inter-American Court mentions in connec-
tion with measures of satisfaction163— actually consists of harm to 
the victim’s trust in the state.  For such trust in the state to be appro-
priate, the state must establish its respect for the individual.  Respect 
for an individual could be understood as an attitude towards the 
other that the person is worthy of equal consideration, a form of re-
spect appropriate to the context of social and political community.  
Thus, repair of social bonds focuses on establishing the reasonable 
trust of the individual in the state based in the respect of state for the 
individual, as is appropriate following a human rights violation.  To 
accomplish this end, the state that committed human rights viola-
tions against its members or citizens must take positive actions to 
rebuild trust.  These positive actions—those necessary to eliminate 
barriers to trust between a society or state and its victims—can be 
understood to constitute reparations.  
The requirement to eliminate appropriate barriers to victim trust 
                                                     
162 This thought combines aspects of Janna Thompson and Margaret Urban 
Walker’s ideas about reparations.  Walker suggests that the reparations are to pro-
mote confidence, trust, and hope in the existence of shared standards of treatment 
and behavior, not trust and respect among persons, as Thompson suggests. MORAL 
REPAIR, supra note 26, at 24, 210; Restorative Justice and Reparations, supra note 77, at 
384; THOMPSON, supra note 152, at 50. Of course, for state reparations, the standards 
of behavior cannot be same for the individual and the state because individuals and 
states do not occupy equivalent or parallel positions with respect to the other that 
would make appropriate a symmetrical relationship.  A state is much more power-
ful than an individual and also is commonly thought to be able to establish author-
itative rules for individuals in the form of law under some conditions.  See, e.g., JOHN 
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 133-72 (1996) (describing the source of a state’s sover-
eignty over its subjects); JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 23-109 (1986); 
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). But see MURPHY, supra note 152, at 
25-38 (insisting on the importance of a reciprocal relationship between state officials 
and individuals). 
163 See Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra 
note 62, at ¶ 441 (holding that the court will keep pecuniary and non-pecuniary 
damages in mind); Pueblo Bello Massacre v. Colombia, supra note 62, at ¶ 264 
(“seeking to repair non-pecuniary damages, which have a special relevance due to 
the extreme gravity of the facts). 
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in the state arising from past human rights violations is a back-
wards-looking reparative obligation, contrary to what de Greiff sug-
gests when commenting on social reconciliation.164  Of course, the 
value of building trust (or reconciliation more generally) might 
sometimes support measures to eliminate general distrust that exists 
in a society even when it did not result from a specific past event 
like a human rights violation.165  But past human rights violations 
create highly specific and personal reasons for victims to distrust the 
state and call for a specific and personal response.166  It is not merely 
the lack of trust, which would be a problem in any society, but the 
fact that it is made reasonable by the past human rights violation.  
So the requirement is backwards-looking in that the past human 
rights violation directly contributes to the need for present action to 
restore trust.167  Of course, the requirement does have a forward-
looking aspect, in that it aims to establish trust in the present by re-
moving reasons for distrust.  But even traditional corrective justice 
aims at a particular result in the present: the erasure of the conse-
quences of a past wrong. 
This focus on rebuilding trust between state and individual im-
mediately explains the standard reparations measures that the 
Court has repeatedly ordered as measures of satisfaction.  The state 
must, to overcome barriers to trust from past human rights viola-
tions, establish its respect for the victim and its commitment to ap-
                                                     
164 See generally Pablo De Greiff, Justice and Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF 
REPARATIONS 465 (Pablo De Greiff ed., 2006). 
165 A period of armed conflict or authoritarian rule may create reasonable bar-
riers to trust even among those who were never subject to serious human rights 
violations.  This lack of trust, even if not well founded, may require the state to 
respond.  
166 Of course, restoring trust serves objectives other than social legitimacy, 
such as maintaining social stability.  And for social stability, it might be more im-
portant to ensure that trust exists, regardless of why it was imperiled.  But legiti-
macy and political participation are important reasons to respond to those barriers 
to trust that arose specifically from the past human rights violation. 
167 The relevant obligation is not a general one to repair any reasonable lack of 
trust in the state but only that which the state caused via its past human rights vio-
lation.  Thus, repair is an appropriate present response to a past wrong, and so it 
has a backwards-looking element of a response to the past but also a present- or 
forward-looking element of reconstructing relationships.  Compare this view with 
that of Brooks, who suggests that the past is relevant because we seek reconciliation 
in response to a broken relationship in the present. Roy L. Brooks, Getting Repara-
tions for Slavery Right—A Response to Posner and Vermeule, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
251, 275-76 (2004). 
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propriate norms of conduct.  Actions like publically recognizing in-
ternational responsibility168 and publicizing the Court’s judgment169 
acknowledge that the state’s past conduct was unacceptable and 
that the victim was entitled to better treatment.  These means of 
communicating the state’s views on the victim’s status and appro-
priate norms are an initial step in overcoming the barriers to trust in 
the state resulting from the past human rights violation.  Other ac-
tions, including commemorative naming of schools or other institu-
tions, establishing museums, or building monuments can have 
much the same communicative or symbolic effect.170  
4.2. Social Repair, Social Context, and Satisfaction 
Although repair of social bonds between victim and state may 
require measures of satisfaction like recognition of responsibility to 
restore trust, it is less obvious why it could require the more exotic 
measures that the Inter-American Court has ordered, such as provi-
sion of infrastructure for displaced communities, educational or 
housing support, or even human rights training.171  On some occa-
sions, these measures might be understood as reparations for vari-
ous material aspects of the harm from human rights violations, re-
gardless of the Court’s classification.  But it bears thinking about 
why the Court could classify them as measures of satisfaction in or-
der to determine the scope and limits of measures of satisfaction as 
a distinct category of genuine reparations.  Fundamentally, the rea-
                                                     
168 See, e.g., Gutiérrez v. Argentina, supra note 2, at ¶ 158; Pacheco Teruel v. 
Honduras, supra note 4, at ¶ 122; Escher v. Brazil, supra note 64, at ¶ 243; Montero 
Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 65, at ¶ 150 (demon-
strating examples of nations taking responsibility for prior harms before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights). 
169 See, e.g., Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 260; Díaz-Peña v. Vene-
zuela, supra note 58, at ¶ 153; Escher v. Brazil, supra note 64, at ¶ 239; Raxcacó Reyes 
v. Guatemala, supra note 64, at ¶ 136; Bulacio v. Argentina, supra note 64, at ¶ 145 
(all demonstrating the various mechanisms through which the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights may require states to publicize its judgments). 
170 Contreras v. El Salvador, supra note 67, at ¶¶ 208, 210; “Street Children” 
(Villagrán-Morales) v. Guatemala, supra note 67, at ¶ 103; Gutiérrez v. Argentina, 
supra note 2, at ¶¶ 162, 164; Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 
280. 
171 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 267; Barrios Family v. Venezuela, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 226; Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶¶ 145-48; García 
Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mexico, supra note 38, at ¶ 80; Montero Aranguren 
(Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, supra note 65, at ¶ 148. 
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son why the repair of social bonds may require more than inexpen-
sive symbolic measures is that a person’s status and other contextual 
factors may negatively affect the depth of harm to the victim’s trust 
resulting from a given human rights violation, the ease of repairing 
trust, and the significance of concrete measures themselves.172 
The repair of social bonds requires that acceptable reparations 
be sufficient to overcome the appropriate barriers to a relationship 
of trust between an individual and his state that resulted from a hu-
man rights violation.  However, aspects of the relationship beyond 
the particular human rights violation will affect how easy or difficult 
it is to overcome the appropriate barriers to trust that the violation 
occasioned.  For example, a bully who regularly verbally demeans 
another and one day punches him or her will have a much more 
difficult time repairing the trust appropriately lost from the punch 
than she would absent the history of verbal attacks.  In this sense, 
                                                     
172 There are several countervailing factors that may make reparations 
measures more effective in repairing social trust than they would otherwise be in 
some circumstances.  First, the circumstances of a resource-limited state make pe-
cuniary reparations beyond full material reparation more demonstrative of respect 
than they would otherwise be because of the burden that providing reparations 
places on the state.  The state must make trade-offs among different funding prior-
ities, some of which will be extremely pressing in the circumstances typical of many 
states.  Although money is fungible, its significance to a resource-limited state de-
pends at least in part on other spending needs, which may include various forms 
of pressing social programs.  Since even a relatively small payment may require 
important sacrifices or tradeoffs on the part of the state, making this payment may 
demonstrate the same degree of caring about the victim as a larger payment would 
for a state with fewer constraints on resources.  
 Second, a similar point applies to non-material reparations, regardless of their 
costs.  Consider the Cotton Field or Atala Riffo decisions, where the victims’ social 
marginalization took the form of widely held attitudes concerning their lack of 
worth, accompanied by discrimination on that basis.  See Atala Riffo v. Chile, supra 
note 12, at ¶¶ 96-98, 146 (holding that the harms done to the victim, which were 
condoned by the state, were largely products of the social stigmatization of the vic-
tim’s sexual orientation in Chile); González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 
12, at ¶¶ 132-35, 154, 163.  An attempt to repair by changing those attitudes is a 
difficult undertaking, given the relative intransigence of such social attitudes.  
Achieving social change of this sort likely requires perseverance and continuous 
effort over a long period of time, not a quick and easy legislative or political change.  
Certainly the state ought to change these deeply problematic attitudes, but it is not 
obvious that reparations for a single or small number of victims can by itself require 
this effort.  Specifically, the difficulty of even a partially successful effort to change 
the underlying culture may be sufficient to restore trust in the state’s respect for the 
victim.  In this sense, social repair may not require the complete removal of under-
lying factors in the human rights violation when a partial removal requires great 
effort and commitment by the state. 
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we might say that other aspects of the relationship may affect the 
reparatory gap that reparations must span in order to make the lost 
trust once again appropriate.  
The social position of a victim subject to social discrimination or 
vulnerability should make it more difficult to overcome the appro-
priate barriers to trust from a past human rights violation.  A socially 
marginalized victim may reasonably consider that the state inade-
quately respected her because of its participation in the discrimina-
tory social practice. The normal treatment that a socially marginal-
ized person receives in a discriminatory society indicates that the 
state does not respect her, a fact that can be cruelly confirmed via a 
specific human rights violation.  An act confirming the general lack 
of respect demonstrated by normal conditions should appropriately 
lead the victim to doubt the state more than she otherwise would on 
the basis of that particular violation.  As a result, social marginaliza-
tion accentuates the gap that the reparations must cover in order to 
eliminate appropriate barriers to trust, so the state may have to make 
additional efforts and provide additional measures of satisfaction.173 
Relatedly, various forms of social marginalization may affect the 
ease of repairing trust when they were closely connected to the hu-
man rights violations themselves.  Often, the perpetrators of human 
rights violations do not target the victims despite their social mar-
ginalization but because of it, or at least take advantage of their in-
creased vulnerability due to the marginalization.174  For example, in 
Cotton Field the fact that society in Ciudad Juarez did not value poor, 
                                                     
173 In contrast, the social position of a privileged person in itself normally 
makes the task of overcoming barriers to trust easier, making reparations beyond 
full material reparations less necessary.  A wealthy person, for example, has a priv-
ileged position in her society by virtue of the abundant resources she is allowed to 
command, reducing any appropriate sense that the state does not adequately care 
about her.  Similarly, other forms of privilege may have similar effects, such as the 
respect that comes with being an editor of a prominent news magazine or a magis-
trate on a high court.  See Constitutional Tribunal (Camba Campos) v. Ecuador, su-
pra note 45, at ¶ 305; Fontevecchia and D’Amico v. Argentina, supra note 39, at ¶ 
123.  The effect of the respect communicated by such social positions makes it easier 
to demonstrate that the state cares, since lack of caring indicated by the particular 
human rights violation suffered is an outlier from that indicated by the treatment 
the victim normally receives.  For this reason, the resulting appropriate barriers to 
trust may be less severe in these circumstances, and reparations that extend beyond 
full material reparation and apologies may be unnecessary. 
174 See, e.g., Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, Magda-
lena Sepúlveda Carmona, Guiding Principles on Extreme Poverty and Human Rights, 
U.N. Doc. A/HRC/21/39 (July 18, 2012) (demonstrating the correlation between 
extreme poverty and victimization in the region). 
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young women may have both explained why the victims were tar-
geted by the non-state actors, but also why state authorities did little 
to respond to their disappearances and faced few domestic conse-
quences for the failure.175  When such forms of social marginaliza-
tion are implicated in a human rights violation, it may be harder or 
impossible to overcome the appropriate barriers to trust without re-
sponding to the role that social marginalization played in the wrong.  
A victim who suffered a human rights violation like forced displace-
ment because of her poverty probably should not begin to trust her 
state once again if it in no way responds to that underlying cause of 
the violation.176  The state has not shown that it is committed to treat-
ing the victim according to appropriate standards regardless of the 
characteristic of the victim subject to marginalization.  
The Inter-American Court has made comments on several occa-
sions that directly indicate the relevance of social vulnerability in 
determining the appropriate reparations:  “The Court recalls that the 
victim in the present case is an indigenous woman, in a particularly 
vulnerable situation, and this will be taken into account in the repa-
rations awarded in this Judgment.”177 
Features of the victim’s context, like vulnerability, may plausibly 
explain why some measures of satisfaction seek to repair social 
bonds between state and individual despite having substantial ma-
terial components in addition to their symbolic dimensions.  For ex-
ample, in the case of Fernández Ortega, quoted above, the Court or-
dered the state to provide financially for a center on women’s rights, 
which both supported a project the victim had and was symbolically 
relevant to the human rights violation suffered, a rape by soldiers.178  
This measure may plausibly contribute to establishing that the state 
has appropriate respect for the victim in order to rebuild trust.  Sim-
ilarly, orders to provide education for victims, even when educa-
tional deficiencies were not themselves connected to the human 
                                                     
175 González (“Cotton Field”) v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 132-35, 154, 163.  
176 For an example of such victims, consider forced displacement and dispos-
session in the context of the Colombian armed conflict. David L. Attanasio & N. 
Camilo Sánchez, Return within the Bounds of the Pinheiro Principles: The Colombian 
Land Restitution Experience, 11 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 1, 13-19 (2012). 
177 Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 223.  See also Rosendo Cantú 
v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 206 (“The Court reiterates that Mrs. Rosendo Cantu is 
an indigenous woman, a girl at the time when the violations occurred, whose situ-
ation of particular vulnerability will be taken into account in the reparations 
awarded in this Judgment.”). 
178 Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 265-70. 
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rights violation, 179 could show respect for the victim and rebuild 
trust following human rights violations that reasonably cause an ex-
ceptional loss of trust.180  Other measures that might be justified in 
this way in some cases include housing for former prisoners,181 hu-
man rights training for officials,182 infrastructure for communities,183 
and many others. 
4.3. The Limits of Repair of Social Bonds 
Although many orders of the Inter-American Court may be le-
gitimate because they seek to repair social bonds, not just any such 
order is.  Such orders would be entirely legitimate only if the Court 
explicitly finds that the human rights violation harmed the victim’s 
appropriate trust in the state and concludes that the proposed 
measures would reasonably repair that trust.  An explicit justifica-
tion of the orders is necessary to guarantee due process against ju-
dicial carelessness, overreach, or abuse.184  This justification, partic-
ularly for the repair of social bonds, requires judicial modesty and, 
concomitantly, a reasonable level of support because the problem of 
determining what measures would reasonably repair victim trust is 
difficult.  Following a severe human rights violation, it is hard to say 
what measures would remove the barriers to trust confronting a rea-
sonable victim.  However, this is not a fatal problem for making le-
gitimate orders to repair social bonds, as the Court regularly over-
comes similar problems in other areas.  For example, the Court 
                                                     
179 See Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶ 147 (ordering educational 
support for the direct victim’s mother because her illiteracy made it difficult to ob-
tain justice). 
180 Osorio Rivera v. Peru, supra note 39, at ¶ 267; Barrios Family v. Venezuela, 
supra note 5, at ¶ 226; Gómez Palomino v. Peru, supra note 10, at ¶ 145-48.  
181 García Cruz and Sánchez Silvestre v. Mexico, supra note 38, at ¶¶ 80, 83. 
182 See, e.g., Montero Aranguren (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, su-
pra note 65, at ¶ 148 (ordering training for officials for preventative reasons). 
183 See, e.g., Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 284 (ordering 
infrastructure measures such as building a hospital, improving streets, and imple-
mentation of a water drainage system); Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. 
Paraguay, supra note 7, at ¶ 301 (ordering the provision of basic goods and services); 
Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 6, at ¶ 230 (ordering 
the provision of drinking water, setting up latrines, and establishing a school); 
Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 71, at ¶ 221 (again, or-
dering provision of drinking water, latrines, and education). 
184 Cf. ATTANASIO, supra Part III.D (explaining how fundamental notions of due 
process require explicit and motivated decisions, which safeguard against careless-
ness, overreach, or abuse).  
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typically orders compensation for moral injury to the victim, which 
requires evaluating pain and suffering and translating it into mone-
tary terms.185  But even if the Court is competent to make these sorts 
of assessments, it ought to cautiously and carefully defend its as-
sessments in the hard case of victim trust. 
 
5.  REPAIR OF COMMUNITIES 
Despite the fact that we might understand orders like those re-
quiring infrastructure for communities as justified in order to repair 
harm to trust, some such orders could be understood more simply 
as efforts to repair the harm done to communities.  The fundamental 
idea of reparations as community repair is that, when a past human 
rights violation harms a community, genuine reparations may at-
tempt to eliminate the harm, or the effects of that harm, to the com-
munity.  Just as traditional corrective justice focuses on undoing, re-
pairing, or compensating for certain material harms to a victim, 
repair of communities focuses on undoing, repairing, or compensat-
ing for harms to community structures.  This basis for reparations is 
consistent with the great regard the Inter-American Court has 
shown for community and social bonds—especially for those of in-
digenous and similar communities.186  This section will analyze the 
concept of community employed in the Inter-American Court’s ju-
risprudence, and then argue that harms to such communities can 
justify legitimate orders to provide reparations.  
5.1. The Concept of a Community 
To begin, it is necessary to identify what a community is accord-
ing to the Inter-American Court in order to determine the sense in 
which community might be harmed by a human rights violation.  
Although the idea of community can be understood in many ways, 
it is possible to organize the different concepts into three main 
groups.  First, there are communities of geography composed of 
people living together in the same place or geographical region, but 
not necessarily sharing any other connection beyond geographic 
                                                     
185 See generally JO. M. PASQUALUCCI, THE PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE 
INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (Cambridge Univ. Press 2003). 
186 It helps explain reparations orders such as those granting reparations di-
rectly to communities instead of to particular persons who were victims of a human 
rights violation,  See Villalba, supra note 1, at 271-72. 
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proximity.  Second, there are communities of common characteris-
tics that include people with shared characteristics, such as history, 
language, religion, economic production methods, values, or cul-
ture.  The people who are part of such a community share character-
istics but need not have any additional relationship to the other 
members.  Third, there are communities of shared interpersonal 
bonds where the members are related to the other members in some 
way, such as a by frequent interactions, social relations (friendship 
and the like), organization, interdependence, or trust.  These sorts of 
communities are intrinsically composed of networks or webs of 
these sorts of relationships among their members, and not just by 
common personal characteristics.187  
Despite this diversity, a conception of community according to 
which a community is a group of persons whose members share in-
terpersonal bonds—such as organization, interdependence, or social 
relations—best corresponds with the usage in the Inter-American ju-
risprudence.  Abstractly, the Court has on occasion referred to “re-
establishing the fabric of the community,”188 a characterization that 
makes most sense when community consists of a network of social 
relations.  More concretely, in its cases on indigenous and tribal 
communities, the Court repeatedly refers to the different forms of 
social organization that exist within the communities.  For example, 
in one case it indicated that “the victims belonging to the Mayan in-
digenous people . . . possess their own traditional authorities and 
forms of community organization, centered on consensus and re-
spect. They have their own social, economic and cultural struc-
tures.”189  But the bonds among individuals do not have to rise to 
                                                     
187 Finally, a community of shared consciousness involves awareness or recog-
nition among members that one of the previous concepts of community binds them 
into a group.  This notion of community does not stand alone, but rather is an ad-
ditional trait that one might think is necessary for a community to fully exist and to 
be of value.  The Court has not emphasized that individual awareness of the com-
munity is necessary for the group to merit legal protection. 
188 Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 267. 
189 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, supra note 63, at ¶ 85.  See also 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 112, at ¶ 149 
(noting communitarian traditions among indigenous peoples that fosters a sense of 
culture); Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra 
note 62, at ¶ 354 (recognizing social structure among indigenous peoples as neces-
sary to continuing their culture); Saramaka People. v. Suriname, Preliminary Ob-
jections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 
172, ¶ 121 (Nov. 28, 2007) (acknowledging that indigenous peoples are entitled to a 
communal, juridical personality). 
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the level of a distinctive authority structure; the Court on a number 
of occasions has indicated the importance of other social ties:  “These 
surviving victims who were displaced from their place of origin, 
‘lost the community and affective ties on which their identity was 
rooted, in addition to their possessions,’ which led to ‘forced 
changes in the social structure, which entail[ed] ruptures, losses, 
pain, and much suffering.’”190  Even though the Court frequently 
makes reference to shared characteristics of the group, it has almost 
always focused on coherent groups held together by social bonds. 
This notion of community has the theoretical advantage that it 
can easily explain the importance of communities to individuals; 
thus, Inter-American human rights law does not have to assume that 
communities in themselves have independent legal standing.  If a 
community is composed of a network of interpersonal bonds, and 
those bonds are of importance to individuals, then the community 
itself is of value to individuals.  The sorts of interpersonal bonds at 
issue—authority and economic structures, for example—can be of 
fundamental importance to individuals, at least when those struc-
tures are not themselves abusive.  Individuals structure their lives 
around their interpersonal bonds, and disruptions to or weakening 
of those interpersonal bonds can have a strong negative effect on 
their lives.  This is particularly true when participation in one com-
munity is not easily replaced with participation in another, similar 
community, notably the case for many indigenous and tribal com-
munities.  Perhaps for these reasons, the Inter-American system has 
been relatively comfortable in granting communities some legal sta-
tus in human rights law.191  Although some states have argued that 
a “community as such could not be considered a victim because it 
                                                     
190 Massacres of El Mozote And Nearby Places v. El Salvador, Merits, Repara-
tions and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 252, ¶ 194 (Oct. 25, 2012) 
(citing an expert opinion presented by the representatives).  See also Ituango Mas-
sacres v. Colombia, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Judg-
ment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 148, ¶ 213 (July 1, 2006) (“Other major negative 
effects of internal forced displacement include . . . social disintegration.”); “Mapiri-
pán Massacre” v. Colombia, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 134, ¶ 175 (Sept. 15, 2005) (explaining the “acute vulnerability” 
of displaced persons). 
191 See e.g., Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community. v. Paraguay, supra note 7, 
at ¶ 45 (referencing a decree which granted the Indigenous Community legal sta-
tus). 
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did not comply with the respective requirements,”192 it is not neces-
sary to view the community itself as the victim, but instead the indi-
viduals who participate in the community.  
Moreover, if a network of interpersonal bonds within a group of 
persons constitutes a community, we can understand the relevance 
of geography and common characteristics to certain communities.  
In a number of important decisions concerning communities, the In-
ter-American Court recognizes that communities continue to exist 
and have value even when displaced from their traditional lands.193  
These communities are constituted independently of mere cohabita-
tion of a particular place.  Nonetheless, according to the Court, ge-
ography can be important for many communities because they are 
organized around certain physical places.  The Court comments, for 
example, that “the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of 
their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic 
survival.”194  Given the particular characteristics of indigenous and 
tribal communities, traditional land may be necessary for the long-
term preservation and flourishing of the community even if the in-
terpersonal bonds among its members are what constitute the com-
munity itself.  
Similarly, common characteristics of a group of people may be 
important for developing or maintaining the social bonds that con-
stitute certain communities.  The Inter-American Court’s line of 
cases concerning indigenous and tribal peoples repeatedly notes 
                                                     
192 See Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra 
note 62, at ¶ 416 (elaborating on the state argument in footnote 62). 
193 See Sawhoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 6, at ¶ 
118-44 (detailing and analyzing how the Indigenous Community is tied to the nat-
ural resources of the land); Río Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 
160-64 (using the example of funeral rites to explain how indigenous people have a 
special relationship with their ancestral lands because they are an integral part of 
the indigenous people’s religious beliefs and therefore their cultural identity and 
integrity). 
194 Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 112, 
at ¶ 149 (cited by Saramaka People. v. Suriname, supra note 189, at ¶ 90).  See also 
Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 160; Xákmok Kásek Indige-
nous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 7, at ¶ 174; Kichwa Indigenous People of 
Sarayaku v. Ecuador, Merits and Reparations, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
C) No. 245, ¶ 217 (June 27, 2012), http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articu-
los/seriec_245_ing.pdf; Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Co-
lombia, supra note 62, at ¶ 354,; Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, 
supra note 71, at ¶ 131 (recognizing the significance of indigenous peoples’ ties to 
their land in varying circumstances). 
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their distinctive and common cultures, religions, languages, values, 
and modes of economic production in support of the need to ensure 
their survival.195  However, the Court has never found the mere 
sharing of such traits to be sufficient by itself to constitute a commu-
nity deserving legal protection, since these cases always involved 
groups of people connected in other ways as well.196  Instead, on oc-
casion the Court has directly suggested that these common traits are 
important simply because of their independent contribution to the 
maintenance and survival of the community, without being what 
makes it a community.  For example, in Plan de Sánchez, the Court 
said “[t]raditions, rites and customs have an essential place in their 
community life.”197  Sharing such highly distinctive common traits, 
while important for certain communities, is not necessary for a com-
munity to merit legal protection.  The Court in Ituango Massacres, El 
Mozote, and Mapiripán Massacre implied that a group merits legal 
protection even when, unlike indigenous and tribal communities, it 
does not share distinctive cultural, religious, or linguistic traits.198  
Thus, even ordinary villages might constitute communities deserv-
ing of legal consideration in the Inter-American system. 
                                                     
195 See e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 71, at ¶ 
131 (emphasizing “culture, spiritual life”); Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, 
supra note 63, at ¶ 85 (highlighting the indigenous “linguistic community”); Maya-
gna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 112, at ¶ 149 (focus-
ing on “their cultures, their spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic sur-
vival”); Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 160 (pointing 
specifically to “religious beliefs and . . . their cultural identity”); Afro-descendant 
Communities (Operation Genesis) v. Colombia, supra note 62, at ¶ 354 (highlight-
ing, again “cultural identity, . . . customs, beliefs and traditions”). 
196 See, e.g., Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 71, at 
¶ 131 (recognizing the close relationship of peoples with their land as the basis for 
their culture); Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, supra note 
112, at ¶ 149 (discussing a communitarian tradition of taking collective ownership 
over a piece of property); Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 160 
(acknowledging the relationship indigenous peoples have with their ancestral 
lands as a part of their identity); Afro-descendant Communities (Operation Gene-
sis) v. Colombia, supra note 62, at ¶ 354 (noting Article 21 protection of ties be-
tween a territory and its peoples). 
197 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, supra note 63, at ¶ 85. 
198 Ituango Massacres v. Colombia, supra note 190, at ¶ 213; “Mapiripán Mas-
sacre” v. Colombia, supra note 190, at ¶ 175; Massacres of El Mozote And Nearby 
Places v. El Salvador, supra note 190, at ¶¶ 194, 305 (citing an expert opinion pre-
sented by the representatives). 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol37/iss3/1
 
2016] EXTRAORDINARY REPARATIONS 867 
 
5.2. Community Repair, Reparations, and Legitimacy  
The fundamental idea of reparations as repair of communities is 
that reparations measures may serve to repair the harm that a hu-
man rights violation causes to a community.  The violation may 
weaken or destroy the shared interpersonal bonds that constitute 
that community.199  It may also remove or change some circum-
stance necessary for those bonds to endure or to thrive.  For exam-
ple, if severe human rights violations cause the displacement of a 
community like a village, the community members may resettle in 
different locations, completely shattering the bonds.  Alternatively, 
they may relocate together, but without access to the land that was 
the material basis for the bonds.  In such circumstances, the state 
may provide reparations that attempt to rebuild or strengthen those 
social bonds, such as by making the existence of the community in 
its place of displacement more viable through the provision of the 
various material resources necessary for it to survive and thrive.200  
At the same time, although a community is constituted by a group 
of people linked by interpersonal relationships, social organization, 
or the like, the reparations might not directly rebuild those relation-
ships.  Rather, they may instead contribute to establishing condi-
tions in which they may thrive.  For this reason, providing circum-
stances in which traditional modes of economic production or 
religious observance are possible may be a form of reparation for 
communities like indigenous or tribal groups. 
Such reparations can be genuine for exactly the same reason that 
traditional monetary compensation can be.  Reparations as repair of 
communities attempt to eliminate or compensate for the concrete 
harmful effects of human rights violations as a form of corrective 
justice.  More traditional applications of corrective justice focus on 
the harms to the individual, whether in concrete forms like loss of 
income or in more ephemeral forms like pain and suffering.  These 
reparations for communities focus instead on eliminating or com-
pensating for the harm to the community that human rights viola-
tions occasion, whether directly to the fabric of the community itself 
or to the way of life in which the community engages.  Fundamen-
tally, this is simply an expansion of a corrective justice perspective 
                                                     
199 See, e.g., Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶87 (noting that 
“[t]he community also suffered the ‘destruction of its social structure’ because ‘its 
relationships with other individuals were forcibly redefined’…”). 
200 See supra note 70 and surrounding text. 
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on reparations to include a greater array of harms, analogous to an 
expansion of corrective justice to include psychological and not just 
physical harms.  It does not require a major rethinking of reparations 
because it once again is aimed at eliminating or compensating for 
the effects of harm caused.  
Measures that appropriately attempt to undo, repair, or com-
pensate for harm to community will vary depending on the circum-
stances.  When a community is completely destroyed by a past hu-
man rights violation, such as a village that disbands following a 
massacre, it may not be possible to do anything more than compen-
sate the victims for the loss of community, either monetarily or in 
some other form that is appropriate.  When a community is merely 
injured, the social bonds weakened or their substructure removed, 
reparations measures may be appropriate to strengthen the bonds 
or restore or replace their substructure.  Measures such as the estab-
lishment of a community development fund,201 or the provision of 
new community infrastructure202 to ensure the community can sur-
vive and rebuild, respond to the harm inflicted on a community as 
the result of human rights violations. 
The Inter-American Court seems to have applied an idea of rep-
arations as repair to communities in certain decisions.  On some oc-
casions, the Inter-American Court indicated that reparations should 
aim to repair the community fabric, and on other occasions it has 
implied that they might do so.203  Fernández Ortega states:  “In the 
present case, the Court underscores the importance of implementing 
reparations that have a community scope and that allow the victim 
to reincorporate herself into her living space and cultural identity, 
as well as re-establishing the fabric of the community.” 204 
This case, which limits the need for community repair to indig-
enous communities, ordered the state to fund a community center 
in part in order to re-establish “the fabric of the community.” 205  
Similarly, in Plan de Sánchez Massacre, the Court granted monetary 
                                                     
201 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 213-15. 
202 Rio Negro Massacres v. Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶ 284; Xákmok Kásek 
Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 7, at ¶ 301; Sawhoyamaxa Indige-
nous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 6, at ¶ 230; Yakye Axa Indigenous Com-
munity v. Paraguay, supra note 71, at ¶ 221. 
203 Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 223, 267; Rosendo Cantú 
v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 206. 
204 Fernández Ortega v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶ 267. 
205 Id. 
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compensation to community members for non-pecuniary damage, 
taking into account in part the harm that the community as a whole 
suffered.206  The Moiwana Community decision explicitly ordered a 
number of measures for the “community as a whole,” including in-
vestigation into the human rights violations, collective titling of 
lands, creation of a community development fund, and construction 
of a monument.207  In other cases, the Court has simply hinted that 
it ordered reparations to repair the community.  In El Mozote, the 
Court ordered, for example, that the state implement a community 
development program for the members of the communities that suf-
fered massacres to improve roads, access to water and electricity, 
health care, and education.208  
However, in several cases, the Court has remained entirely silent 
about the basis of its reparations even though they might be under-
stood as repair of communities.  For example, in Rio Negro Massacres, 
where many residents of Rio Negro resettled in Pacux following 
massacres, the Court required that the state implement a number of 
measures to improve life in Pacux without comment on the basis for 
the measures.  These measures included provision of medical per-
sonnel for the health center, food security programs, improved 
streets, supply of water, drainage and sewers, and improved school-
ing facilities.209  Similarly, in a number of cases concerning displaced 
and dispossessed indigenous and tribal communities, the Court has 
ordered similar measures while the community awaits the restora-
tion of its traditional lands.210  A natural interpretation is that the 
                                                     
206 Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 86-88. 
207 Moiwana Community v. Suriname, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 194, 205, 209, 213-
14, 218. 
208 Massacres of El Mozote And Nearby Places v. El Salvador, supra note 190, 
at ¶ 339; Moiwana Community, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 124, ¶¶ 212-15. 
209 The Court based the measures on the state’s responsibility for the original 
displacement without clearly identifying a causal relationship.  There is some indi-
cation in the judgment that the food insecurity was in fact caused by the original 
displacement, as the Rio Negro community made a living from fishing and agricul-
ture.  However, the judgment neither indicated that the community previously had 
adequate healthcare, streets, water and sewage, and education, nor held that their 
absence in itself constitutes a human rights violation.  See Río Negro Massacres v. 
Guatemala, supra note 8, at ¶¶ 65, 183, 284.  See also Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. 
Guatemala, supra note 63, at ¶ 110 (requiring similar measures without clarity about 
the basis). 
210 Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 71, at ¶ 221; 
Xákmok Kásek Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 7, at ¶ 301; Saw-
hoyamaxa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, supra note 6, at ¶ 230. 
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Court is attempting to maintain the viability of the communities un-
til they can be reunited with the land that forms a fundamental basis 
for their long-term existence.211 
5.3.  The Scope and Limits of Repair of Communities 
Assuming that ordering repair of communities harmed by hu-
man rights violations is legitimate, the Court would have substantial 
space to require reparations with this aim.  Although many human 
rights violations straightforwardly harm communities—mass dis-
placements, for example—other violations may also cause such 
harm even when the violation does not appear collective in nature.  
For example, the extrajudicial execution of a community leader may 
well cause harm directly to the community, which depends on that 
person for much of its coherence and stability.  In some cases, this 
harm to the community might be exactly the point of such an extra-
judicial execution.  Consequently, it may well be legitimate in such 
cases to grant reparations that attempt to overcome the harm to the 
community resulting from the human rights violation.  In fact, the 
Court has even suggested on occasion that repair to community may 
be necessary in cases where the human rights violation does not di-
rectly harm the community, such as in two cases where soldiers 
from the Mexican armed forces committed sexual assault against in-
digenous women.212 
Reparations as repair of community can explain a range of the 
extraordinary reparations that the Inter-American Court has or-
dered, but it cannot explain just any extraordinary measure.  The 
Court may legitimately order reparations to repair communities 
only when a community was actually harmed.  First, the Court must 
determine that a relevant community actually exists, which involves 
both a factual and legal inquiry concerning the nature of communi-
ties that can be the basis for reparations.  Second, it must find that 
the community was harmed in some way by the human rights vio-
lations proven in the case.  Some human rights violations—for ex-
ample, the forced disappearance and torture of street children—
would not cause substantial harm to communities and so could not 
                                                     
211 Another possible interpretation is that these measures are necessary to 
avoid violating economic, social, and cultural rights, and so constitute a disguised 
cessation order. 
212 Rosendo Cantú v. Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 70-75; Fernández Ortega v. 
Mexico, supra note 12, at ¶¶ 78-84. 
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be the predicate for legitimate orders to repair a community.  The 
Court must explicitly satisfy both of these requirements in order for 
its reparations orders to be fully legitimate, as motivating the orders 
is an essential due process protection against judicial carelessness, 
overreach, or abuse, which is particularly important when exercis-
ing an expansive power to intervene in state policy.213 
6.  CONCLUSION 
 This Article has argued that many of the extraordinary repa-
rations orders the Inter-American Court makes in its contentious 
cases are legitimate despite initial appearances.  Some may be un-
derstood as legitimate orders to cease ongoing human rights viola-
tions, such as a failure to take measures to ensure the enjoyment of 
human rights.  These are not technically orders to provide repara-
tions, but are within the competence of the Court nonetheless.  Many 
orders to provide guarantees of non-repetition may be understood 
in this way.  Other orders may be understood as legitimate orders 
to provide genuine reparations that repair the social bonds between 
a state and individual by eliminating the reasonable barriers to trust 
arising from the human rights violation.  Measures of satisfaction 
may seek to eliminate these barriers to trust, whether the measure is 
primarily symbolic in nature, or combines symbolism with concrete 
benefits for the victim.  Finally, certain orders directed at communi-
ties may constitute genuine reparations, even when they do not cor-
respond to concrete material harm to victims, if they repair harm to 
communities that resulted from the human rights violations. 
 
                                                     
213 Cf. ATTANASIO, supra Part III.D (explaining how fundamental notions of due 
process require explicit and motivated decisions which safeguard against careless-
ness, overreach, or abuse). 
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